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This thesis examines the interoperability of federal law enforcement’s Big Six 
investigative agencies, to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration, Alcohol Tobacco Firearms 
and Explosives, Internal Revenue Service-CID, and the United States Secret Service-
Investigations.  The main issue is whether, in the post-9/11 environment of transnational 
and terrorist criminal threats, the current administrative and jurisdictional configuration 
of the Big Six within three executive departments with overlapping duties marginalizes 
the nation’s investigative work-product.  This discussion includes the establishment of 
metrics used to gauge the functionality of the Big Six and, thus, to determine whether 
Negative Characteristics are present that materially affect the “total” mission.  
Ultimately, the conclusion is drawn that the integration of the Big Six into a single 
agency, namely the FBI, would better serve the nation’s federal investigative law 
enforcement needs.  This leads into the next area of discussion, which is how to integrate 
the Big Six.   Associated with both these topics is an analysis of what the federal 
investigative mission means and whether it should include a domestic intelligence 
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We are now in a long-term struggle against persistent, adaptive 




Federal law enforcement, like many other disciplines, was not immune to the 
changes created by the events of September 11.  Seemingly overnight, the focus of 
federal law enforcement changed from the War on Drugs to the War on Terror.2 While 
each involves invidious transnational actors, this new war has impacted the American 
psyche in a much deeper and visceral way.  It has also stirred a cynicism, scrutiny, and 
public appetite to redress the defects that exist in government administration.   This surge 
of interest propelled the passage of the Homeland Security Act in 2002 (HLSA), and the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which were intended to 
promote interoperability across all strata of government, including federal law 
enforcement.   
A derivative effect of the HLSA and creation of DHS was the material 
reconfiguration of the status, mission and/or administration of federal law enforcement’s 
main investigative agencies, specifically the FBI, ICE, DEA, ATF, IRS-CID and USSS-
Investigations, collectively referred to in the remainder of this thesis as the Big Six.  
While agencies like the ATF and USSS were transferred between executive departments, 
some agencies were dismantled and new ones created.  The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and the United States Customs Service (USCS) were among 
these agencies.   The various elements of the former INS and USCS were transformed 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, 
10–11. https://www.defenselink.mil/pubs.   [Accessed March 17, 2006]. 
2 The War on Drugs was an initiative begun in 1971 by President Nixon, undertaken to carry out an 
all-out offensive against the non-medical use of certain prohibited drugs. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Drugs.  [Accessed February 26, 2006].  The term “War on Drugs” is 
not a literal war in the constitutional or international law sense in that Congress did not declare “war” 
pursuant to its authority in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution nor did the enemy constitute a 
national actor, but rather organized criminal elements. 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articlei.html#section8; 
http://www.genevaconventions.org/.  [Accessed February 26, 2006]. 
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into new agencies within DHS and given new missions.  The Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) was one of these new agencies.    
The FBI was also not immune from the change in national priorities.  While the 
FBI’s metamorphosis was not externally apparent like that of the USCS, INS, USSS or 
ATF, it has nonetheless incurred a material change in perspective.  Subsequent to 9/11, 
FBI Director Robert Mueller modified the FBI’s mission to focus on prevention of 
terrorist attacks. 3  Since that time, the FBI has been attempting to construct an 
intelligence service and transform itself into a hybrid law enforcement and intelligence 
agency. This change of mission was reinforced with the recent creation of the National 
Security Service, which incorporates the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence with the 
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions.4  While 9/11 exposed the need for a 
better domestic intelligence infrastructure, it is not wholly accepted within academic and 
government circles that this need should subsume the FBI. 
The central topic of this thesis regards the foundational conflicts that exist among 
the Big Six and how these conflicts negatively affect the nation’s investigative work-
product.  As discussed in Chapters II, III and IV, the Big Six do not function at an 
optimal level.  While the expectation in the post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
Era is that interagency operations would become enhanced, the evidence collected for 
this thesis, from both government reports and an original survey, suggests that gains in 
this area involving federal investigative agencies have been limited and will diminish 
over time.  
The central theoretical proposition of this thesis is that the proximate cause of this 
dysfunction is the decentralized, autonomous manner in which the Big Six are 
configured.  The existence of six distinct entities in three different executive 
departments—Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury—diminishes the collective 
capability because it generates non-productive qualities, such as interagency rivalry, 
                                                 
3 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “What We Investigate,” and “FBI History.” www.fbi.gov.   
[Accessed September 23, 2005]. 
4 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Headline Archives,” 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june05/nss062905.htm.  [Accessed January 4, 2006];  Gregory F. Treverton, 
“The Next Steps in Reshaping Intelligence,” RAND Corporation, 2005.  
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redundancy, data fragmentation, jurisdictional foreclosure, and civil rights violations.  I 
refer to these qualities collectively in Chapter IV as Negative Characteristics.   
The central reform proposed in this thesis is that these Negative Characteristics 
present in ICE, FBI, DEA, ATF, IRS-CID and USSS-Investigations operations can be 
overcome by integrating the Big Six into the Department of Justice (DOJ) and eventually 
merging them into a reconstituted FBI.   Further, such integration will not simply mitigate 
the Negative Characteristics, but create synergy and, thus, an exponentially improved 
work-product.  In Chapter VI, I discuss the manner in which the Big Six should be 
integrated by introducing the concept of Integration Evolution as the multi-phased 
movement in which the Big Six should be unified.  A central purpose of Integration 
Evolution is to avoid many of the pitfalls associated with merging separate bodies into a 
unified entity.  My focus on evolutionary change is a particularly important and sensitive 
issue because the recent formation of DHS appears to have created a negative impression 
of agency merger, particularly in the post-Hurricane Katrina collective mindset.   
This thesis also examines the maximization of synergy within a reconstituted FBI.   
In Chapter VII, I explore the need to create an autonomous domestic intelligence agency.  
I advocate for the segregation of Investigative and Intelligence disciplines because their 
missions, while parallel, are accomplished in different ways and by different standards.  
The hypothesis is that by removing the nation’s domestic counterintelligence and 
counterterrorism-intelligence missions from the FBI, its focus will narrow and make it a 
better investigative agency.  This comports with the traditional law enforcement identity 
and mentality of the Big Six agencies, particularly the FBI, which has been the nation’s 
largest and most renowned criminal investigative agency with jurisdiction to enforce 
some 200 categories of federal law.5    
 
B. BASIC ARGUMENTS AND QUESTIONS 
In this thesis I argue that the integration of the Big Six into a single agency will 
enhance the overall federal law enforcement mission to investigate and punish criminal 
violators.  In order to lay the proper foundation for this assertion, the thesis contains two 
                                                 




postulates; first, whether the current decentralized, autonomous configuration of the Big 
Six produces Negative Characteristics, and secondly, whether these characteristics are 
material and pervasive within Big Six operations.  The discussion then explores the 
architectural design for integrating the Big Six into a reconstituted FBI.  The thesis 
concludes by examining the mission of the reconstituted FBI and whether the U.S.’ 
homeland security intelligence needs will be best fulfilled by a hybrid 
investigative/intelligence agency, such as the FBI or an autonomous, single-discipline 
domestic intelligence agency.  
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
In the thesis I utilized a variety of analytical techniques.  These techniques 
included a review of literature from the fields of Intelligence, Criminal Investigations, 
Business Administration, and Mergers/Acquisitions, as well as evidence-gathering 
methods.  Analyses of historical events, case studies, and comparative institutional 
analysis were also utilized to establish the inferential progression of the paper.  The thesis 
begins with a discussion of how to identify the characteristics of functional government 
operation.  Once identified, it focuses on the measure of these characteristics, that is, the 
materiality and pervasiveness of these characteristics within Big Six operations.  At the 
core of this analysis, and the one related to the integration of Big Six operations, is a 
broader Investigative versus Intelligence discipline analysis.  This discussion focuses on 
whether a law enforcement agency can adequately support a dual 






II. THE WHY OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
INTEGRATION 
[T]he whole of an integrated and networked force is far more capable 
than the sum of its parts.6 
 
Since its inception in March 2003, DHS has been attempting to forge the federal 
government’s largest reorganization in fifty years.  Creating an entire executive 
department with the core mission of protecting the country from terrorism, has presented 
many challenges and affected the interrelationships of the Big Six.  While DHS has made 
meaningful changes, the department is still striving to enhance its competence and 
standing within the government.7  Recent organizational restructuring proposals from the 
Second Stage Review seek to improve the department’s capabilities.8 One critical need 
within the department is to bolster its capacity to identify and address societal needs with 
a department-wide perspective, rather than through a single component.9   Ironically, it is 
the HLSA—an act meant to clarify and streamline the post-9/11 or GWOT Era 
environment—that is the source of much of this confusion.  
ICE, as DHS’ largest investigative agency, should be leading law enforcement’s 
fight against terror.  However, ICE is unable to assume this role for a number of reasons.  
Based on its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the FBI, ICE lost its lead 
                                                 
6 National Defense Strategy 2005, 14.  
7 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Audits, Major Management Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security,”  December 2005, 3. 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_06-14_dec05.pdf.   [Accessed January 3, 2006]. 
8 The Second Stage Review was a systematic evaluation of the DHS’ operations, policies and 
structures.  It utilized 18 action teams to evaluate six specific operational and policy issues that will drive 
the near-term agenda for DHS.  The six imperatives are to increase preparedness with particular focus on 
catastrophic events; strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform immigration processes; 
harden transportation security without sacrificing mobility; enhance information sharing with our partners, 
particularly with state, local and tribal governments and with the private sector; improve DHS stewardship, 
particularly with stronger financial, human resource, procurement, and information technology 
management; and realign the DHS organization to maximize mission performance. 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597.  [Accessed January 4, 2006].  
9 Office of Audits, Major Management Challenges,” 15.  
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federal agency authority to pursue domestic counterterrorism investigations.10   Not 
withstanding the MOU, ICE does not have the investigative infrastructure, experience or 
resources to lead the nation’s domestic counterterrorism mission.  Regrettably, the FBI, 
which is the lead federal agency, does not either.  Though the FBI currently has more 
capability and experience, it lacks jurisdiction, capability, knowledge and expertise in 
customs and immigration enforcement, two requisite disciplines for combating 
international terrorism.  The resultant codependence of ICE and the FBI has created 
significant and ongoing tension between the two agencies. 
The ICE/FBI conflict, while perhaps the most vivid within the counterterrorism 
field, is neither the only one nor a newly created phenomenon.  Within the federal law 
enforcement spectrum, the FBI does not have lead agency status to investigate all the 
crimes that may intersect with terrorism.  For example, ICE is the lead on immigration 
and importation crimes, the USSS on counterfeiting crimes, IRS on tax crimes, DEA on 
narcotics and ATF on firearms and explosives.  Since these agencies are autonomous, 
their vision remains agency-centered and they seek to maintain a proprietary interest in 
their operations and work-product.  Because of this, each has valuable information that 
the others cannot access or know to exist.  
But is it productive to allow them to shield their assets and investigative work-
product when each shares the same goal?  All organizations exist to produce something 
and in regards to the Big Six this creates systemic problems. The Big Six engage in all  
 
                                                  
10 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Justice and The Department of Homeland 
Security Concerning Terrorist Financing Investigations, May 13, 2003.  (The basis for the MOU stemmed 
from the need to coordinate governmental efforts as they related to terrorist financing investigations.  After 
9/11 attacks, the Departments of Treasury and Justice each established programs designed to target terrorist 
financing schemes.  The programs functioned independently, though efforts—albeit unsuccessful—were 
made to coordinate investigative procedures and define jurisdictional boundaries.  Such attempts 
exacerbated long-standing agency disputes, particularly between the FBI and the U.S. Customs Service’s 
Office of Investigations, which is presently part of ICE.  The intent of the MOU was to create a 
collaborative environment, but the practical result was the unilateral realization of authority in the FBI. The 
MOU has in many ways inhibited the Nation’s counterterrorism response because the expertise and 
resources from former USCS have not been sufficiently incorporated into the FBI.  Neither ICE nor the FBI 
has openly explained the reason for this, but, intuition suggests that interagency rivalry is a main factor.   
For a good summary of this issue, refer to the Letter from Richard M. Stana to Thad Cochran and Robert C. 
Byrd of the Senate Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, February 2004, 
United States General Accounting Office, GAO-04-464R, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04464r.pdf   
[Accessed June 22, 2005].)  
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facets of the homeland security matrix: deterrence, preemption, prevention, protection 
and response.11   Certainly, the autonomous construct of the Big Six impedes the sharing 
of information.  
Big Six decision makers do not possess all the materially accessible information 
needed to make informed decisions. Truly, before any item can be produced or a service 
provided, strategic and operational decisions must be made.  So when an information 
deficit exists, decision making capabilities are lowered and performance suffers.  Within 
the Big Six, this information deficit decreases individual and collective agency 
productivity because each agency must either make uninformed decisions or take 
superfluous steps to obtain the relevant information.  
In his book Administrative Behavior, Nobel Laureate economist Herbert A. Simon 
noted “it is impossible for the behavior of a single, isolated individual to reach any high 
degree of rationality.”12  Simon’s idea is predicated on the value information has on 
mental processes and how mental processes are enhanced through interpersonal 
exchanges.  Though Simon’s work did not focus on the administration of federal law 
enforcement agencies, the import of his theory transcends the interagency law 
enforcement relationships and exposes the continual interoperability failures present in 
the law enforcement and intelligence communities.   
The ability to obtain information is one of the main problems organizations strive 
to overcome.13  Many post-9/11 commentators recognize this and the reason is clear.  If 
enhanced interagency relationships promote information sharing and information sharing 
improves the U.S. counterintelligence/counterterrorism strategy, then the concept of 
interoperability is not only “rational” in the Simonian sense, but a smart strategy. 
Deductively, the sharing of additional resources should improve interagency operations 
                                                 
11 Tony Kendall and Richard Bergin, “Homeland Security Technology Matrix,” Intro to Technology 
Framework, Slide 2. https://www.chds.us/courses/mod/resource/index.php?id=13.  [Accessed March 17, 
2006]; Deterrence means no attack is planned; Preemption means a plan is detected, actors identified and 
neutralized before plan develops; Prevention means actors are identified after the plan is developed, but 
neutralized before they attack; Protection means defending against the attack; Response means managing 
the consequences of an attack. 
12 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organization, 3d ed. (New York City: The Free Press, 1976), 79, 81. 
13 Donald F. Kettl, Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets, (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institutions, 1993), 23. 
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even more. Viewed in this manner, the integration of the Big Six into a single entity is 
rational because it is a complete collective form. 
A centralized command structure, such as the one needed by the Big Six to foster 
the integration of the disparate elements, is not unique to public governance or law 
enforcement.  In his book about business administration, Designing Organizations, Jay R. 
Galbraith found that in order for an organization to execute a multidimensional strategy 
the interdependence of functional units requires coordination across departments.  Thus, 
if units are interdependent they must coordinate to function.  Therefore, when an 
endeavor, like federal law enforcement, becomes multidimensional it is not wise to 
decentralize operations into small autonomous units because they will become 
uncoordinated and perform at a less than optimal or “dysfunctional” level.  More 
complex networks are needed because all the dimensions must be considered before a 
decision is made.14  Recognition of the interdependence becomes paramount. 
If nothing else, the current Big Six configuration can be fairly characterized as a 
complex network where overlapping jurisdictions have caused more than one 
Memorandum of Understanding to be drafted in order to quell systemic interference.  
Further, the existence of the Big Six within three separate executive departments causes 
decentralization and categorizes each agency as an autonomous unit.  Unfortunately, 
today’s threat spectrum is not compartmentalized and transnational criminal actors cause 
autonomous Big Six investigations to intersect.  This in turn instigates the unintended, 
and often times unwelcome, collusion among the effected agencies in order to 
competently combat the threat.   This collusion becomes a tacit admission of 
interdependence.  This admission opens the door to central question; how should the 
interdependence be managed?   
In order to answer this question, the construct of modern federal investigative 
agencies needs to be examined because the failures of interdependence lie in this 
framework.  The modern system can be traced to two primary sources.  The first derives 
from an antiquated early-20th century model in which federal law enforcement agencies 
were created to address specific problems.  This established the diffused and autonomous 
                                                 
14 Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Organizations, An Executive Guide to Strategy, Structure and Process, 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 5.  
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nature of today’s agencies.   The second source is founded in the growth of respective 
agency responsibilities in order to address new or evolved threats.  
The examination of the genesis and evolution of federal law enforcement agency 
jurisdictions lays a foundation for the proposals put forth in this thesis.  In this context, 
these proposals should appear less provocative because this retrospective examination 
reveals that the construct of federal law enforcement has been continually changing.  It 
further shows that the confluence of independent and broadened agency jurisdictions 
have become a more evident obstruction as the Big Six attempt to address the terrorism 
threat from different angles.  It also indicates that the current framework is not malleable 
enough or sufficiently unified to address modern threats.  The lessons of historical change 
show that the architecture of federal law enforcement has and should continue to modify 































III. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
In American history, the Progressive Era signifies the time when the federal 
government realized the supremacy it fought for in the Civil War.   Essentially, the 
foundation of federal supremacy established by the Union’s victory was built upon during 
the Progressive Era, which lasted from the late-19th century to the beginning of World 
War I.15  Progressive reform came in response to the predatory capitalistic actions of 
entrepreneurs and monopolistic corporations that spawned in the post-war era known as 
the Gilded Age.   
During the Gilded Age, the federal government’s regulatory strategy was 
completely different from what it is today.  The federal government adopted a law 
enforcement strategy in which private litigation, as opposed to public regulation, was the 
principal manner in which social wrongs were righted.  In this model, the judiciary 
assumed a primary role in “policing” malevolent acts.  This is in sharp contrast to the 
primary role the executive branch plays today.  The big difference is that the former 
keeps social order by assessing and awarding damages after the fact while the latter seeks 
to prevent the act from occurring.16  
The litigation strategy traces its roots to agrarian America, when the difference in 
individual wealth amongst the citizenry was not great.  In the Gilded Age this changed, as 
large corporations gathered huge resources and their shareholders amassed great wealth.  
This had a collateral corruptive impact on the justice system as judicial postings became 
politicized and judges were elected or appointed through the lobbying efforts of the rich.  
As injustice and public displeasure excelled, a paradigm shift occurred and the belief that 
private litigation was the cure for social wrongs waned.   
                                                 
15 Randall G. Holcombe, “Federal Government Growth Before the New Deal,” The Freeman, 
September 1, 1997, reprint The Independent Institute.. 
http://www.independent.org/printer.asp?page=%2Fpublications%2Farticle%2Easp?id=360.   [Accessed 
February 1, 2006]; “Learn About the Progressive Era,” Digital History. 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/modules/progressivism/index.cfm. [Accessed March 7, 2006]. 
16 Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, “The Rise of the Regulatory State,” Journal of Economics 
Literature XLI (June 2003): 414.  
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Progressive reformers advocated a more socially conscious role for government.  
One progressive demand was for the restoration of law and order. A derivative of this 
was the creation of regulatory agencies and the professionalism of existing agencies to 
control specific areas of the economy.  In the area of law enforcement a series of new 
organizations and legislative acts set the stage for change.   Regulatory agencies at both 
the state and federal level began instituting anti-trust, pricing, as well as food and drug 
reforms.17   Amongst these new organizations and laws were the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (1887), The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), the Food and Drug 
Administration (1906), the Federal Reserve (1913), the 16th Amendment (Federal Income 
Tax, 1913), the Federal Trade Commission (1914), the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act 
(1914) and the Immigration Act (1917).  The Harrison Act, which prohibited the 
production, importation or sale of opium, cocaine and their derivatives, and the 
Immigration Act, which significantly expanded the classes of excludable persons, remain 
at the heart of modern federal law enforcement.18   
The FBI traces its origins to this era.19  The FBI originated in 1908 during the 
Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt who created a corps of Special Agents within the 
Department of Justice. Today, it seems evident that our country needs a federal 
investigative service, but in 1908, the creation of a “federalist” agency was highly 
controversial.20  Interestingly, the core of expertise used to create this new national 
agency came from the United States Secret Service (USSS).21    
The USSS traces its origins to 1865, when President Lincoln responded to the 
economic threat brought about by the South’s counterfeiting of the Union’s currency in 
what, arguably, may be America’s first economic based terror attack.  It was not until 
                                                 
17 Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, “The Rise of the Regulatory State,” Journal of Economics 
Literature  XLI (June 2003): 416.  
18 Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, 1914. 
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/e1910/harrisonact.htm. [Accessed February 16, 2006];  MSN 
Encarta, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761566973_3/Immigration.html.  [Accessed March 7, 
2006]. 
19 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI History, http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/origins.htm.  
[Accessed September 28, 2005]. 
20 Ibid. 
21 United States Secret Service, Secret Service History, http://www.secretservice.gov/history.shtml.  
[Accessed May 9, 2006]. 
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President McKinley was assassinated in 1902 that the USSS’ mission expanded to 
include the role of presidential protection.22  This mission continued to expand and today 
includes former presidents, their families and presidential candidates.  Over time, this 
non-investigative mission has gained primacy and today the USSS is most recognizable 
as a protective agency.  While the USSS continues to investigate counterfeiting crimes, 
many of its investigations lack continuity as its agents are regularly called away to 
perform protective details.  This is unfortunate because in today’s global economic 
environment, organized criminal and terrorist groups have adopted sophisticated 
counterfeiting techniques and identity thefts schemes.  Unfortunately, the USSS is being 
pulled in one direction while global consumerism and crime go in another.    
It is not uncommon for federal law enforcement agencies to evolve or “creep” 
into areas of enforcement that have no or little association with their original purpose.  
Take ATF as an example. ATF, formerly of the Department of Treasury, but currently 
part of the Department of Justice, traces its tax collecting roots to the post-Revolutionary 
period.  In 1789, under the new Constitution, Congress imposed a tax on imported spirits 
to address the Revolutionary War debt the federal government assumed from the states.23  
During the next 181 years, ATF essentially existed as a division of the Internal Revenue 
Service.  This ended in 1970 when “moved by growing perception that the IRS’s 
revenue-collecting bias did not reflect ATF Division’s enforcement skills, overtures 
began toward ATF independence.”24   In 1970, congress officially recognized ATF’s 
explosives expertise and two years later Treasury Department Order No. 120-1 
transferred the functions, powers and duties related to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and 
explosives from the IRS to ATF. Then in 1982 arson became a federal crime and ATF 
became responsible for investigating commercial arson nationwide.25  Today, ATF is 
identified as the nation’s arson and explosives experts, which seems to be exactly how it 
wants to be identified.  Within ATF, alcohol and tobacco investigations are not 
                                                 
22 United States Secret Service, Secret Service History, http://www.secretservice.gov/history.shtml.  
[Accessed May 9, 2006]. 
23 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, History,  





considered glamorous and are not pursued as aggressively as they should be despite the 
fact that cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting operations are prevalent and a lucrative 
source of terrorist financing schemes.  This has not been lost on other agencies, in 
particular ICE, which created its Cornerstone program to deal with this threat.26 As with 
the USSS, ATF’s new mission and priorities have pulled it away from its original 
jurisdiction.   
The DEA also came into existence as the offspring of other federal agencies. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. had three agencies—USCS, the Office of 
Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs—
involved in drug investigations.  DEA was created in July 1973, by President Nixon 
pursuant to Executive Order 11727 in order to establish a single command structure.  
Many of DEA’s new agents were selected from the USCS’ Office of Investigations, and 
many accepted top positions with the new agency.27  Despite the loss of numerous 
experienced agents, USCS agents continued to conduct narcotics cases, in conjunction 
with, and at other times, against their former colleagues.   The narcotics investigations 
field became even more congested when in 1982 the Attorney General gave the FBI 
concurrent jurisdiction over narcotics violations in the United States.28   
Though the Progressive Era is deemed to have ended when the U.S. became 
involved in World War I, the framework it established is reflected in the current 
configuration of the Big Six.   In fact, Prohibition, which began in 1920 with the 
enactment of the 18th Amendment and ended some thirteen years later with the 
ratification of the 21st Amendment, provided federal law enforcement with its first 
“War”.   Prohibition also provided an opportunity for federal agencies to meld their                                                  
26 Cornerstone is ICE’s initiative to detect and close down weaknesses within U.S. financial, trade and 
transportation sectors that can be exploited by criminal networks. Active partnership between law 
enforcement and the private sector is a key component of Cornerstone. Such partnerships are built by 
sharing law enforcement typologies and methods with businesses and industries that manage the very 
systems that terrorists and criminal organizations seek to exploit. This sharing of information allows the 
financial and trade community to take precautions in order to protect themselves from exploitation. In 
return, ICE receives information, "red flags", tips, and insight from these industries to more effectively 
investigate these complex and sophisticated criminal schemes. 
http://www.ice.gov/partners/financial/index.htm.  [Accessed July 3, 2006] 
27 Drug Enforcment Administration, “DEA History Book, 1970–1975,” citing the Senate Committee 
on Government Operations report issued on October 16, 1973, 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/history/deahistory_01p.htm, [Accessed November 11, 2005]. 
28 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI History.” 
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forces in a sustained interdisciplinary approach that involved the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, Customs Service, Coast Guard and Department of Justice.29  These 
interdisciplinary endeavors continue and have evolved into the myriad law enforcement 
task forces that exist today.   
As recently as April 2006, ICE announced that it will lead a brand new Document 
and Benefits Fraud Task Force.  According to ICE Assistant Secretary Julie Myers, the 
task force model is critical to “harnessing the expertise of numerous agencies…new task 
forces are badly needed to help combat the significant threats posed...”30  During the 
same press conference attended by Ms. Myers, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty 
added, “document fraud is a serious problem and is the common element of many 
different crimes.”31   Of course, terrorism is the most notable.  In instances when 
document fraud intersects with terrorism, as it did in 1993 with Ramzi Yousef, the 
mastermind of the first World Trade Center Bombing, the ICE led task force will cede 
investigative control to the FBI led Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), in which various 
Big Six agencies are also members.   Task forces like these, and others such as the 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) and the High Intensity 
Financial Crimes Area Task Force (HIFCA), to name a few, are recognition of the fact 
that federal law enforcement agencies, particularly the Big Six, are as Galbraith termed 
“coordinated interdependent units.”32   
Though Galbraith’s findings on organizational functionality derived from his 
examination of private sector companies, such as Hewlett-Packard, 3M and Boeing, and 
not federal law enforcement agencies, this makes little difference from a command and 
control perspective.  Federal law enforcement agencies are interdependent functional 
units.  The difference between federal law enforcement and Boeing is that Boeing is a 
single corporation with a unified structure while federal law enforcement is divided into 
                                                 
29 Randall G. Holcombe, “The Growth of the Federal Government in the 1920s,” Cato Journal 16:2, 
(Fall 1996), 193. 
30 Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Task Forces 
Created in 10 Cities to Combat Document and Benefit Fraud, April 5, 2006. 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/060405dc.htm.  [Accessed May 26, 2006]. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Galbraith, Designing Organizations, 5. 
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autonomous units with separate commands.  Because the GWOT Era is characterized by 
multidimensional criminal enterprises it is not reasonable to expect that narrowly 
programmed federal law enforcement agencies can address the threat without becoming 
interdependent.  The confluence of interdependence and autonomy is not systemically 
consonant with Big Six operations because these qualities become exceedingly diametric 
in an environment where entities vie for recognition and budgetary validation. 
An excellent discussion of the ongoing challenges that federal law enforcement 
agencies encounter in coordinating their respective functions can be found in Richard M. 
Stana’s paper “Investigating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.”33   Though the 
paper examines “federal law enforcement agencies’ efforts to cooperatively investigate 
money and terrorist financing” the baseline of his message centers on the interagency 
rivalry between the FBI and ICE, created by the passage of the HLSA.  Stana’s finding 
that interagency rivalry leads to a breakdown in capability reinforces the concept that the 
diffusion of federal investigative authority does not promote functionality.  
Stana focuses on one investigative area shared by ICE and the FBI, namely, 
financial crimes, noting how money laundering and financial schemes are utilized by 
terrorists to promote their activities.  He then goes on to discuss how the FBI and ICE are 
attempting to reconcile their respective missions.   The importance of his analysis is the 
conclusion that the existence of these two separate executive departments has lead to 
“operational and organizational challenges” that have failed to include the development 
of “effective interagency relationships.”34  He found that these failures have lead to the 
resource constraints, competing priorities, and lack of investigative synergies.35  While 
he does not explicitly find that the merger of ICE and the FBI would facilitate the 
eradication of these deficiencies, his findings support that opinion.   
                                                 
33 Richard M. Stana, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, “Investigating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing:  Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Continuing Coordination 
Challenges,” United States General Accounting Office, GAO-04-710T, May 11, 2004, 4. 
http://www.gao.gov/news.item/d04710t.pdf.  [Accessed March 15, 2006];  Letter from Richard M. Stana to 
Thad Cochran and Robert C. Byrd of the Senate Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on 
Appropriations, February 2004, United States General Accounting Office, GAO-04-464R, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04464r.pdf.  [Accessed March 17, 2006]. 
34 Stana, “Investigating Money Laundering,” 3. 
35 Ibid, 6. 
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The lack of investigative synergy is an important concept because the central 
theory of this thesis is that integration of the Big Six will not only mitigate the Negative 
Characteristics discussed in the next chapter, but create synergy among the Big Six and 
eventually a reconstituted FBI.  The basis for merger must be the expectation of a net 
gain.  Thus, the effects of a merger must be multiplicative not merely additive:  That is, 
the sum of the whole must be greater than the value of the individual parts.36 As 
discussed in the next chapter, the agencies comprising the Big Six are devalued because 
their segregation produces Negative Characteristics that can be marginalized through 
integration.  Merging the Big Six will create synergy. 
One countervailing position to the integration of the Big Six is the proposition 
that the way forward is to look back.  Rather than fusing the agencies to marginalize the 
negative byproduct of segregation, it would be better to streamline their missions.  For 
example, instead of creating a single Drug Enforcement Division within a new 
conglomerate agency, it would be better to remove the narcotics jurisdiction from ICE 
and the FBI, and let DEA stand with exclusive federal jurisdiction.   
In many ways, this proposition echoes the sentiment of the Progressive Era when 
agencies were formed to address specific threats.  Unfortunately, with today’s multi-
crime, multi-jurisdictional actors, a single agency/single threat strategy is insufficient.  
Additionally, such a strategy will not lessen agency interdependence or the problems 
concomitant with it.  While removing jurisdiction from ICE and the FBI might mitigate 
the inherent redundancy in having three agencies police the same crime, it would do 
nothing to remedy other negative factors.  In fact, it would probably exacerbate the 
problem because in today’s multidimensional threat environment criminal and terrorist 
organizations do not act unilaterally, thus, a unilateral agency cannot fully engage it.  In 
such a situation, even the redundancy would not be lessened because the missions of 
various agencies would eventually collide as they pursue complex organizations that 
traffic in narcotics, counterfeit merchandise, human smuggling and financial fraud, to 
name some examples.  
                                                 
36 J. Fred Weston, “The Determination of Share Exchange Ratios in Mergers,” The Corporate Merger, 
(Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 130. 
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Another solution also exists. A more contemporary answer may be to create a 
position for federal law enforcement akin to the recently anointed Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI).   In his paper, “Organizing for Homeland Security,” political scientist 
Charles R. Wise identifies three options related to the coordination and collaboration of 
newly created governmental positions, which can be characterized as White House 
Control, Power Sharing and Congressional Control.37   
The first, White House Control, envisions “executive order coordination” in 
which the president and his staff coordinate the activities of the different executive 
offices that have standing to pursue a particular issue.  Executive order coordination 
allows the entities involved to remain decentralized, while simultaneously promoting 
“flexibility by relying on the broad executive power of the president”.38  This is very 
much in line with the DNI’s management principle of “centralized oversight, 
decentralized execution.”39  This option was pursued by President Bush when he 
established the Office of Homeland Security.  The main advantage of this model is that it 
is flexible and allows for rapid response since there is virtually no congressional 
oversight.40   
The second and third options, Power Sharing and Congressional Control, require 
the formalization of the position and the bifurcation of control between the Executive and 
Legislative Branches.  Here, the newly created Director of Federal Investigations (DFI) is 
established by law rather than by executive order.  In his paper, “The Disaster after 9/11:  
The Department of Homeland Security and Intelligence Reorganization,” Charles Perrow 
discusses how the Gilmore Commission recommended this procedural option when it 
                                                 
37 Charles R. Wise, “Organizing for Homeland Security,” Public Administration Review 62:2 
(March/April 2002): 135. http://www.dni.gov/reports/cda_14-25-2004_report.pdf.  [Accessed May 26, 
2006]. 
38 Charles Perrow, “The Disaster after 9/11:  The Department of Homeland Security and the 
Intelligence Reorganization,” Homeland Security Affairs II:1:3 ( 2006): 4–8. 
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=2.1.3. [Accessed May 23, 2006].  
39 Report on the Progress of the Director of National Intelligence in Implementing the “Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” May 2006, 1. http://www.dni.gov/reports/cda_14-25-
2004_reports.pdf.  [Accessed July 12, 2006].  
40 Perrow, “The Disaster after 9/11,” 4. 
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examined the need for a national office for combating terrorism.41  This office was to be 
statutorily empowered, but located within the White House.  This option “gives the 
president considerable authority, but it is shared with Congress, which writes the laws 
governing it.”42  In this setting, such a law could mirror the Section 102 of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which empowers the DNI 
thusly: 
Section 102 
(b) PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY—Subject to the authority, 
direction, and control of the President, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall— 
(1) serve as the head of the intelligence community; 
(2) act as the principal advisor to the President, to the 
National Security Council for intelligence matters 
related to the national security; and 
(3) consistent with section 1018 of the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, oversee and direct 
implementation of the National Intelligence Program. 
Admittedly, the creation of a DFI would be speculative, especially since it is too 
early to measure the impact of the DNI.  Assuming for a moment that the DNI is a 
glorious success, the creation of a DFI would not have the synergetic effect that 
integrating the Big Six would.  As discussed in Chapter VII, the disciplines of 
Intelligence and Investigations are different, so much so that the characteristics, which 
negatively affect the performance of the Big Six, do not adversely affect the Intelligence 
Community.   
One of the lessens learned from the Progressive Era model is that compartmenting 
or streamlining law enforcement agencies will not lessen the negative byproduct 
                                                 
41 Perrow, “Disaster After 9/11,” 7; (The Gilmore Commission’s official designation is the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
The Advisory Panel assessed the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. Response 
capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels will be examined, with a particular emphasis on the latter 




generated by their coterminous existence.  Further, a DNI type position operates far 
above the micro-level required of a law enforcement manager whose operational 
timetable is far shorter and, thereby, more dynamic.  The recommendations made herein, 
namely, the integration of the Big Six and the removal of the domestic intelligence 
mission from federal law enforcement, are the best solution.  A newly reconstituted FBI 





IV. DEFECTS IN THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION 
Organizational reform is not a panacea.  There is no perfect 
organizational design, no flawless managerial fix…Even excellent 
organizational structure cannot make impetuous or mistaken leaders 
patient or wise, but poor organizational design can make good leaders 
less effective… 
General Charles G. Boyd43 
 
The first step in approaching the subjects of integration and comparative 
organizational structure is to explore the defects of the current configuration.  This will 
lay the foundation for the central question, “will the integration of the Big Six make the 
nation safer?” In order to accomplish this, the deficiencies of the current system and the 
expected benefits of the proposed system must be weighed against the cost of changing to 
the new system.  Of course, a prerequisite in devising a new scheme is that defects can be 
corrected without causing more serious harm. 
In terms of organizations, the government is like a “super-firm” that is able to 
influence outcomes in a manner no private entity can.  This does not mean that the 
government is immune from market forces.44  The administration of government is 
influenced by different elements than those that impact private organizations, which in 
the course of their affairs pursue the goal of efficiency.  Capitalistic efficiency is 
measured by obtaining a desired level of output at the lowest possible price.  This does 
not exclude efficiency as a desired outcome of government administration, but indicates 
that it should not be the sole influence in the policymaking process.   
The challenge facing government entities is not profitability, but accountability to 
the public good. In his book, Sharing Power, Donald F. Kettl identified the metrics of 
accountability for government organizations. Though Kettl’s work involved performance 
                                                 
43 General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.), preface to “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for 
Change,” The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, (Hart-Rudman 
Commission),  http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf.  [Accessed February 14, 2006]. 
44 Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost’” Journal of Law and Economics, 3:1(October 
1960): 23.  http://www.sfu.ca/~allen/CoaseJLE1960.pdf.  [Accessed March 3, 2006]. 
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of government administration through decentralization and reliance upon the private 
sector to fulfill traditional government services his performance measures are easily 
applied in other areas.   
Kettl identified five measures—efficiency, effectiveness, capacity, responsiveness 
and trust/confidence—which are suitable criteria for examining the efficacy of integrating 
the Big Six.  He called these the Five Standards.45  What is unclear from Kettl’s work is 
whether the Five Standards are meant to be prioritized.  It seems logical that Kettl did not 
seek to prioritize the standards because the relative weight of an individual standard will 
fluctuate from situation to situation based on the facts.  In reality, the standards either 
“compete to shape the public interest” or interact in a complementary way.46   
Using Kettl’s definition of efficiency—the maximum output for the lowest 
input—it becomes clear that the success of law enforcement agencies cannot be judged 
by this standard alone.  For example, that most effective policing strategy might not be 
the most cost preventative strategy, therefore maximum output requires more than 
minimal input.  In a Use of Force context, a police department may require the use of a 
less-than-lethal device such as a taser in lieu of a firearm in a deadly force situation.  The 
firearm is a more effective tool for terminating the threat, but the taser may promote trust 
and confidence in the community because the citizens feel the Use of Force policy has 
integrity and that the police respect their civil rights.   
Before an informed decision can be made regarding the benefit of the integrative 
model, the current configuration must be examined and certain condition precedents 
established.  First, it must be determined whether the current configuration of six 
independent agencies in three executive departments creates negative byproducts that 
reduce optimal functionality.  Assuming that this hypothesis is true, the second issue to 
be resolved is whether the integration of the Big Six will mitigate the negative 
byproducts, and, thus, enhance the output of investigative work-product.    
Based on my professional experiences and conversations with prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, military personnel, local/state/federal police officers and criminal 
                                                 
45 Kettl, Sharing Power, 19. 
46 Ibid, 17. 
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defendants, I have identified five characteristics that are present in and adversely impact 
the investigative capabilities of the Big Six.  Certainly, other characteristics may exist, 
but these appear dominant. These five Negative Characteristics are defined as follows: 
1) Interagency Conflict—the real or perceived incongruity of agencies’ interest 
that detrimentally affects the performance of one or both of the agencies.  
Such conflict can materialize in different forms like interagency rivalry, 
mistrust or malfeasance.  One example of this can be seen in the law 
enforcement context, when, during a joint operation, the participating agencies 
vie for control or credit for an action or case. 
2) Redundancy—the duplication or repetition of action.  One example of this can 
be seen in the law enforcement context, when two or more agencies 
participate in an investigation and unnecessarily perform the same or similar 
tasks.  These tasks can be administrative, such as report writing, or 
operational, such as assigning personnel to participate in an enforcement 
action when there are already sufficient human resources. 
3) Data Fragmentation—the collection and segregation of information, which 
prevents the sharing of it.  One example of this can be seen in the law 
enforcement context when one agency has information regarding a suspect 
that may be of value to another agency and does not or cannot provide access 
to the information or make the other party aware of the information. 
4) Jurisdictional Foreclosure—the inability to enforce a law due to lack of 
authority or resources.  Lack of authority can be seen in the law enforcement 
context when a DEA agent is prevented from pursuing Immigration violations 
or an FBI agent is prevented from conducting a lawful border search.  Lack of 
resources can be seen when ICE establishes a minimum weight for drug 
offenses before it will open an investigation. 
5) Violation of Civil Rights— The deprivation of rights belonging to an 
individual, including civil liberties, due process, equal protection of the laws, 
and freedom from discrimination through an act or omission to act by law 




Kettl’s Five Standard methodology can be used to evaluate the Big Six by 
associating the characteristics to the Five Standards.  The presence of the characteristics 
would indicate that the current configuration does not function at an optimal level.   In 
conducting this analysis, no attempt will be made to singularly qualify or rate the 
characteristics due to their interrelationships.  Additionally, the quantification of the 
standards between the comparative models—the current configuration versus the 
integrated configuration—cannot be made because traditional metrics such as number of 
arrests, search warrants executed, reductions in crime, etc. are unobtainable since the 
integrative model advocated herein has never existed.   













Table 1.   Correlating the Five Standards with the Negative Characteristics 
 
Admittedly, the application of the Negative Characteristics to the Five Standards 
may be inexact insofar as it is based on intuition rather than science, but such exactness is 
not required to establish the basic association, particularly since circumstantial evidence 
can carry the same weight as direct evidence.   The establishment of some association 
between the Negative Characteristics and the Five Standards primes the main argument, 
which is that positive elements such as efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, capacity 
and integrity are affected by the existence of negative elements such as interagency 





Responsiveness Capacity Integrity 
Interagency 
Conflict 
    
    (i)   Rivarly x x   x 
   (ii) Mistrust  x   x 
   (iii) Malfeasance  x   x 
Redundancy      
    (i) Admin x x X   
    (ii) Operational x x    
Data 
Fragmentation 
     
    (i) Intentional  x X x x 





















     
    (i) Authority x x X x  
    (ii) Resources x x X x  
Violation of 
Civil Rights 
x x X x x 
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conflict, redundancy, data fragmentation, jurisdictional foreclosure and/or civil rights 
violations. This leads to the conclusion that the generation of Negative Characteristics 
will cause an entity to under-perform.  From this foundation, questions related to 
materiality and pervasiveness can be addressed.  Anecdotal evidence of the presence and 
relevance of the Negative Characteristics within Big Six operations is presented below.    
 
A. NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS:  INTERAGENCY CONFLICT, 
REDUNDANCY, DATA FRAGMENTATION AND JURISDICTIONAL 
FORECLOSURE 
An interesting examination of inefficiency through redundancy is found in a 2004 
Inspector General Audit report related to the Arson and Explosive Databases individually 
operated by the ATF and FBI.  The databases exist so that state and local law 
enforcement officers can seek and provide arson and explosives data for investigative and 
intelligence purposes.  The auditors identified the joint jurisdictional responsibility the 
ATF and FBI share for investigating and compiling data about arson and explosive 
related events.  They also recognized this as the source of inefficiency.  The auditors 
noted that the separate yet duplicative databases caused a redundancy of effort and 
discrepancy in the accuracy, availability, and uniformity of the information, which led to 
a waste of resources.47  While this audit provided only a micro-inspection of 
governmental inefficiency, the problem exists in other areas and between other agencies.  
A good example of how data fragmentation promotes, not simply inefficiency, but 
grave ineffectiveness is documented in the 9/11 Commission Report.  In January 2001, a 
joint FBI/CIA source identified a person known as “Khallad” as the director of the USS 
Cole bombing.  The CIA later connected Khallad to one of the 9/11 bombers, but did not 
notify any U.S. law enforcement agency.  The 9/11 bomber, Khalid al Mihdhar, entered 
the U.S. under his real name, but because U.S. law enforcement was not informed of his 
nefarious connections, it did not search for him.  The 9/11 Commission found that had 
the information been shared, al Mihdhar could have been located and detained, thereby 
                                                 
47 The United States Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report 05-01,The 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives’ and Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Arson 
and Explosives Intelligence Databases, Executive Summary, October 2004. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/ATF/a0501/index.htm.    [Accessed October 14, 2005]. 
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disrupting at least part of the plot.48  Though the Commission analyzed the interaction 
between an intelligence agency, CIA, and an investigative agency, FBI, the point that the 
failure to share data promotes mission failure is established and applies with equal or 
greater weight to this proposal.  If anything, the information sharing solutions between 
law enforcement agencies should be easier to facilitate since they operate in a more 
codependent manner. 
Unfortunately, this does not always happen.  During 2002, DEA, ICE, FBI and 
the Mexican government’s PGR participated in Operation Sky High, an international 
cocaine smuggling investigation.  ICE played a significant role in the investigation based 
on its control of a confidential source (CS) who was a high ranking member of the 
cocaine smuggling cartel.49  Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between ICE 
and DEA, which has primary jurisdiction in U.S. narcotics cases, ICE notified DEA 
about its source. The MOU, originally entered into between the former USCS and DEA, 
was created to promote communication and cooperation while concurrently mitigating 
dangerous, confrontational and redundant activities.50  One of the primary purposes of 
the MOU was to quell the interagency rivalries that promulgated the creation of DEA in 
the first place.51   
During the investigation, DEA accused ICE of failing to share information 
gathered from the CS.  DEA expressed to ICE that it felt this failure was based on ICE’s 
lack of trust in DEA’s agents. As the investigation progressed, ICE gathered material 
information from the CS that it did not share with DEA.  Some of this information 
pertained to the CS’ role in at least one, but maybe as many at thirteen, homicides 
                                                 
48 The 9/11 Commission Report:  Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2004) 267, 272.  
49 Letter from DEA Special Agent in Charge Sandalio Gonzalez to ICE Special Agent in Charge John 
Gaudioso, dated February 24, 2004, www.narconews.com/print.php3?ArticleID=1248&lang=en.  
[Accessed February 6, 2006]; Alfredo Corchado, “Border official demoted during inquiry,” Dallas 
Morning News, June 4, 2004, www.dallasnews.com/cgi-bin/bi/gold_print.cgi.  [Accessed February 8, 
2006]. 
50 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Drug Enforcement Administration and The United 
States Customs Service To Implement Title 21 Cross-Designation Policies and Procedures, 
http://oi.ice.dhs.gov/search.asp. [Accessed February 6, 2006]. 
51 Drug Enforcement Administration, “DEA History Book, 1970–1975.” 
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committed in Mexico.  The CS also informed ICE that two of DEA’s Mexico based 
agents had been identified by the cartel.   
Allegedly, ICE did not share any of this information with DEA because it was 
worried that the information would detrimentally affect the joint investigation as well as 
another exclusive ICE investigation involving illegal cigarettes.  DEA eventually learned 
about the information the CS provided to ICE, but not until hired killers working for the 
cartel went to the residence of one of its Mexico based agents.  DEA immediately 
conducted an emergency evacuation of the two agents and their families.   
This case unfortunately portrays how interagency rivalry, redundancy and data 
fragmentation can materially and adversely affect the Big Six mission.  Had a single 
narcotics agency been involved, instead of three, this redundancy would not have existed.  
Further, a unified command structure would have prevented the data fragmentation and 
more capably identified and suppressed the rivalry.  Interagency rivalry is an ongoing 
threat to competent government function.   
Unfortunately, rivalry, both inter and intra-agency, will always exist.  For 
example, it is not uncommon for different divisions within a unified business, military or 
police command to interfere with or fail to support the other’s operations as they compete 
for funding or credit.   The difference is that in a unified command, such transgressions 
are easier to identify and remedy.  Within a single command, transgressors are subject to 
the same institutional and peer review scheme and disciplinary policy.  When commands 
are divided, negligent or malicious acts are more frequently overlooked by the uninjured 
agency as it seeks to gain advantage or shield itself and/or its employee from liability.  It 
also engenders an “us against them mentality,” which perverts conceptions of loyalty and 
fidelity.  
While the above case may seem extreme it is not.  After the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the FBI redirected its resources to fight the War on Terror.  Prior to 
May 2003, neither ICE nor the FBI had lead agency status to investigate terrorist 
financing schemes.  In fact, ICE’s Green Quest Program was probably more developed 
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and operational than any of the FBI’s programs.52  In order to coordinate efforts, mitigate 
duplicative allocation of resources, and wage a seamless law enforcement campaign 
against terrorist financing, ICE and the FBI entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on May 13, 2003.  The terms of the MOU designated the FBI as 
the “primary” investigative agency, and directed ICE to transfer its terrorism-related 
investigations to the bureau.  Despite the transfer of cases, the MOU sought to create a 
cooperative climate where ICE agents continued to participate in terrorist financing 
investigations by being assigned to the FBI’s JTTFs.53    
After entering the MOU, ICE agents from Houston wrote a T-III wiretap 
application so it could intercept the telephonic communications of a terrorist financing 
target.  The T-III application was forwarded to the FBI’s local office, the local U.S. 
Attorney’s Office and the Department of Justice’s Counterterrorism Section and Office of 
Enforcement Operation.  Each determined that probable cause existed linking the 
financing scheme to international terrorism.   Per the MOU, the T-III application was 
then forwarded to the FBI’s Headquarters for its concurrence.  For over three months, 
FBI-HQ needlessly delayed its approval.  During this time, more the 700 communications 
with a suspected nexus to terrorism were not intercepted.  
Ultimately, due to the FBI’s delay, ICE was unable to conduct its investigation 
and closed its case.  The FBI did not pursue the investigation and later admitted that it 
mishandled the T-III application and the delay should not have occurred.  Persons 
familiar with the situation stated that in their opinion the FBI’s delay was not based on 
negligence, but on its desire to protect its turf.54  
                                                 
52 Operation Green Quest was a USCS-led financial enforcement initiative designed to harness the 
formidable financial expertise and authority of the Treasury Department to freeze accounts, seize assets, 
and, where appropriate, bring criminal actions against individuals and organizations that finance terrorism. 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/legacy/2002/22002/02262002.xml.  
[Accessed July 12, 2006]. 
53 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Justice and The Department of Homeland 
Security Concerning Terrorist Financing Investigations, May 13, 2003.  
54 Letter from Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles E. Grassley to the Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, dated June 3, 2005.  
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/TVNews/Dateline%20NBC/grassley.pdf; [Accessed 
February 8, 2006].  Letter from ICE Special Agent in Charge Joseph R. Webber to Senator Charles E. 
Grassley, dated January 24, 2005. 
http://msnbcmedia.com/i/msnbc/Sections/TVNews/Dateline%20NBC/webber_letter%20_to_grassley.pdf. 
[Accessed February 8, 2006]. 
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In this case, the government failed to operate efficiently, effectively and 
responsively because of interagency rivalry and redundancy.  ICE could have conducted 
its investigation had it not needed the FBI’s approval, which under the circumstances was 
completely unnecessary since the ICE officials and Department of Justice attorneys had 
already scrutinized it.  The involvement of the FBI in this case, even had it approved the 
wiretap, added no value and only created an avenue for failure, which is what occurred.  
In many ways, ICE’s ability to conduct financial investigations has been foreclosed by 
the MOU.   
A more common example of jurisdictional foreclosure is evidenced in the 
following example.  Pre-September 11, 2001, the former USCS and DEA initiated an 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation targeting the 
smuggling of pseudoephedrine into the U.S. from Canada and the unlawful transfer of 
criminal proceeds from the U.S. to Yemen.55  At the time, neither agency had the 
authority to conduct Title 8 Immigration investigations, which was critical since nearly 
every target in the investigation was an immigrant from Yemen. 
In an effort to pursue the immigration violations, and to perhaps recruit potential 
informants, the OCDETF coordinator from the former INS was asked to commit 
resources to the investigation.  Despite an expression of intention to do so, none really 
materialized.  A telephone number for an immigration agent was forwarded to the USCS 
and DEA case agents and contact was made.  Unfortunately, the INS agent stated that 
INS could not spare resources to the investigation because Mexicans, not Middle 
Easterners were his office’s priority and the office was overwhelmed.  Consequently, no 
immigration charges were filed though it was discovered that a number of targets were in 
the U.S. illegally. In fact, multiple sources of information have estimated that 90% of 
Yemeni immigrants that came to the U.S. prior to 1995 entered or remained in the U.S. 
under false pretenses.  Regrettably, many of these persons remain in the U.S. because 
their whereabouts is no longer known. 
                                                 
55 The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) is a federal drug enforcement 
program that focuses attention and resources on the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking 
organizations. OCDETF provides a framework for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to 
work together to target well-established and complex organizations that direct, finance, or engage in illegal 




B. NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS:  CIVIL RIGHTS 
The threat of transnational criminal and terrorist organizations is ubiquitous.   The 
controversial issues involved in addressing these threats are the steps the U.S. is prepared 
to take to combat them.  Commonly, these steps interfere with traditional conceptions of 
right and wrong.  Recent acts such as the non-judicial arrest of Jose Padilla, the un-
reviewed classification and detention of persons at Guantanamo Bay, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, and the NSA’s warrantless electronic monitoring of persons within the U.S. are 
examples of this.  Unfortunately, it would be a bit misleading to suggest that such abuses 
and/or illegal government activity did not occur until recently.  Watergate, Iran-Contra 
and the FBI’s COINTELPRO, a program aimed at suppressing political dissent during 
the 1960s and 1970s, are historical examples.56  Therefore, public concern over the 
integration of the Big Six is not unreasonable, at least superficially.   
Ideally, agents from each of the Big Six agencies would never commit errors or 
violate citizen’s rights and in the great majority of cases they do not.  However, most 
civil rights violations go unrecognized and unreported by the public.  Considering that 
each Big Six agency prioritizes the value of internal enforcement individually, the 
operating environment is quite unregulated.  Recalling that breaches of Integrity 
negatively affect each of the Five Standards, the mitigation of civil rights violations 
becomes not only an issue of fairness, but also performance.  
The collective thought that the people of the U.S. are willing to cede their civil 
liberties and absorb invasions of their privacy for the sake of security, without any proof 
that the security measures work, is waning the more distant 9/11 becomes.57  Historically, 
four circumstances lead to government abuses of civil rights:   
(1) Surveillance and the secret gathering of information;  
(2) the collection and retention of unnecessary information;  
(3) the use of legally obtained information for improper purposes; and  
(4) the failure to verify information used in official government 
applications, such as search warrants.58  
                                                 
56 Treverton, “The Next Steps in Reshaping Intelligence,”14. 
57 Ellen Alderman, “Homeland Security & Privacy, Striking a Delicate Balance,” Carnegie Reporter, 
2:1 (Fall 2002).  http://www.carnegie.org/reporter/05/homeland.  [Accessed June 23, 2005]. 
58 Unknown source. 
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The main fallacy with the argument against the creation of a unified national 
police force, at least as it relates to the Big Six, is that the coalescence of federal law 
enforcement agencies does not ipso facto portend a greater threat or loss of rights.  To a 
certain degree this may seem counterintuitive, but the integration advocated here, along 
with the streamlining of the law enforcement mission argued for in Chapter VII, will 
diminish the potential for constitutional or civil rights violations. 
Concomitant with the centralization of the Big Six is the administrative oversight 
of its actions.  Within the context of the Big Six, the American public is exposed to six 
separate investigative agencies probing into their affairs.  It is no secret that each of these 
agencies compiles and stores its own data, thereby increasing the probability of abusive 
government surveillance, the secret gathering of information, as well as the collection and 
retention of unnecessary information, six-fold.   
The actions of each Big Six agency are monitored by their own internal 
mechanisms, variously referred to as Internal Affairs, Office of Professional 
Responsibility and/or Inspector General.   These agencies maintain oversight of the 
agencies for which they work not any of the others.  This means six different 
interpretations of six different policies.   
In his prepared testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 2001, 
Michael Bromwich, the former Inspector General of the Department of Justice, addressed 
the “privileged and protected status” the FBI has within the Justice Department.59   While 
Bromwich’s testimony related to DOJ Inspector General-centric issues and not the 
integration of the Big Six, his comments relate to this discussion because DOJ and the 
FBI are the intended destinations for the Big Six at completion of the Integration 
Evolution discussed in Chapter VI.   
In defense of his position that the DOJ’s Inspector General can maintain oversight 
of the FBI, Bromwich stated “For most of our history, concerns about the FBI’s 
becoming a national police force have been countered by the assurance that it is under the 
                                                 
59 Prepared Testimony of Michael R. Bromwich before the Senate Judiciary Committee, June 20, 
2001, 3. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_hr?062001_bromwich.html.   [Accessed August 23, 2005]. 
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control of the Justice Department and the Attorney General.60  A logical extension of this 
statement is that the integrity of the Big Six once consolidated within DOJ, and 
ultimately merged into the FBI, can be maintained.  The core of Bromwich’s testimony is 
that objectivity cannot be regulated when oversight is completely housed within an 
agency and emphasized this point by highlighting some of the mistakes committed by the 
FBI that affected civil liberties, to include the matters of Wen Ho Lee, Ruby Ridge, and 
Richard Jewell.61   
Bromwich’s expectation that the Justice Department can maintain adequate 
oversight of the FBI should not be interpreted to mean that departmental oversight can be 
expected to eradicate all civil rights violations committed by law enforcement.  This is of 
little consequence since the central issue is whether the integration of the Big Six will 
proximately cause a rise in such violations.  Future research into this area would be 
beneficial.  Intuitively, it seems that with appropriate oversight integration of the Big Six 
will promote procedural congruity and accountability, which will lead to more 
operational uniformity and fewer violations.   
 
C. CONCLUSION 
The idea of integrating law enforcement agencies is not new, and as the events of 
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have shown, the need for law enforcement to operate in a 
smarter and more cohesive manner has never been more evident.  However, the current 
configuration of major law enforcement agencies within three different executive 
departments, Justice, Treasury and Homeland Security produces interagency conflict, 
redundancy, data fragmentation, jurisdictional foreclosure and civil rights violations, 
which affect and, thereby, diminish the collective and singular efforts of each agency.  
With this in mind, the seminal issue is not whether the current configuration promotes 
dysfunction.  All human endeavors are prone to fail in some regard.   
As obvious as the failures discussed above are, it would be misleading to argue 
that the occurrence of such events mandates the overhaul of federal law enforcement’s                                                  
60 Testimony of Michael R. Bromwich, 8. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_hr?062001_bromwich.html.   [Accessed August 23, 2005].  
61 Ibid. 5–6. 
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main investigative agencies if they are isolated, anomalous events.  Of course, the 
premise here is that the examples, while striking, are not extreme. Rather they are 
common and not surprising to persons familiar with federal law enforcement.  This 
assertion was tested via a survey of law enforcement officers.  The results of the survey 









































It has not often enough been recognized that in many cases the review of 
work can just as well be confined to a randomly selected sample of the 
work as extended to all that is produced. 
Herbert A. Simon62 
 
During the months of January–May 2006, I conducted a survey of selected law 
enforcement officials in an effort to gather evidence on federal law enforcement 
interoperability.  The participants of the survey were comprised of experienced local, 
state and federal investigators who had conducted multi-agency federal cases involving 
the Big Six, within the Northern District of California, Ninth Appellate Circuit.63  A 
broader nationwide survey would be more encompassing, but by limiting the survey to a 
single region, any findings regarding the absence or presence of characteristics creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the same exists elsewhere, absent contrary evidence.  It 
should be noted that three of the four cases cited in the previous chapter and used as 
scenarios in the survey, did not occur in the Northern District of California. 
The expectation of the survey was that the findings would validate the author’s 
assertions that the Negative Characteristics, presented in Chapter IV, are ubiquitous and 
materially impact the enforcement of federal laws.   Further, that the post-9/11 changes in 
operating procedure and agency configuration, did not and will not mitigate these 
characteristics.  In the survey, the participants reviewed sanitized versions of the four 
case studies presented in last chapter. After reviewing each case, the participants were 
asked three questions.  After completing the four scenarios the participants were asked 
one general question regarding the impact 9/11 has had on the interoperability of federal 
law enforcement agencies. 
                                                 
62 Simon, Administrative Behavior, 315. 
63 The group was limited to this single federal jurisdiction for two reasons.  The first was simply for 
logistical reasons since I am located there. The second, and more important, is because the Ninth Circuit 
and, specifically, the San Francisco Bay Area is arguably the nation’s most socially liberal and judicially 
progressive.  Such a jurisdiction exacerbates the scrutiny federal agents are subject to and may amplify the 
working environment.  The degree in which this might impact the presence or perception of the Negative 
Characteristics is unknown, but it does provide a benchmark by which additional study can be compared. 
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As noted previously, the scenarios presented in Chapter IV were obvious 
examples of government fallibility.  The purpose of limiting the participants’ choices to 
the Negative Characteristics was to determine their viability as metrics of dysfunction for 
federal law enforcement operations.  That is, to see if the participants could easily relate 
the characteristics to the facts presented in the scenarios.  Neither the purpose nor the 
expectation was that a single characteristic would be associated with a specific scenario. 
While the results of the survey, which appear in a diagram later in the chapter, reveal that 
the participants tended to associate a particular characteristic with a scenario, rarely did a 
participant select only one.  Again, this is of little consequence since the characteristics 
are not mutually exclusive and are in some situations comparable.    
The crux of the survey lies in the third question, which seeks input from the 
participants regarding their professional experience.  This third question addresses the 
seminal issue of this thesis, which is how pervasive the Negative Characteristics are 
within federal law enforcement interagency operations.  The interoperability issue is at 
the core of not only modern law enforcement, but homeland defense and security as a 
whole.  As discussed previously, in the GWOT Era no Big Six agency can singularly 
address the threat.  Thus, once the presence of negative characteristics is established, 
materiality and scope become central.  The survey is presented below: 
 
Law Enforcement Survey 
 
The following survey is designed to gather your opinions on the subject of interoperability 
between law enforcement agencies.  The survey contains four scenarios.    
 
After reading each scenario you will be asked three questions.  Your answers may be as short or 
long as you desire, but fuller explanations are encouraged.   
 
The questions will focus on the overall law enforcement goal(s) presented in the scenario, i.e. 
dismantle a criminal conspiracy, collection of evidence, identify sources and methods, etc., and 
whether any of the four characteristics described below were present.  
 
If one of the scenarios is similar to a personal law enforcement experience, please describe it. 
 
At the end of the scenarios, you will be asked one general question.     
 






1) Interagency conflict 
2) Redundancy 
3) Data fragmentation 




1) Interagency Conflict—the real or perceived incongruity of agencies’ interest that 
detrimentally affects the performance of one or both of the agencies.  Such conflict can 
materialize in different forms like interagency rivalry, mistrust or malfeasance.  One 
example of this can be seen in the law enforcement context, when, during a joint 
operation, the participating agencies vie for control or credit for an action or case. 
 
2) Redundancy—the duplication or repetition of action.  One example of this can be seen in 
the law enforcement context, when two or more agencies participate in an investigation 
and unnecessarily perform the same or similar tasks.  These tasks can be administrative, 
such as report writing, or operational, such as assigning personnel to participate in an 
enforcement action when there are already sufficient human resources. 
 
3) Data Fragmentation—the collection and segregation of information, which prevents the 
sharing of it.  One example of this can be seen in the law enforcement context when one 
agency has information regarding a suspect that may be of value to another agency and 
does not or cannot provide access to the information or make the other party aware of the 
information. 
  
4) Jurisdictional Foreclosure—the inability to enforce a law due to lack of authority or 
resources.  An example of lack of authority can be seen in the law enforcement context 
when a DEA agent is prevented from pursuing Immigration violations or an FBI agent is 
prevented from conducting a lawful border search.  An example of lack of resources can 





In January 2001, a confidential source, jointly handled by an U.S. intelligence agency and a U.S. 
investigative agency, identified a person known as “Mohammad” as a terrorist.  The U.S. 
intelligence agency later identified “Mohammad” as Mohamed LNU and connected him with a 
known terrorist.  The U.S. intelligence agency did not notify its investigative counterpart or any 
U.S. law enforcement agency of its findings.  Mohamed LNU entered the U.S. under his real 
name.  He was not denied entry because U.S. border agents were not informed of his true identity 
or terrorist connections.  Once in the country, no U.S. investigative agency searched for 
Mohamed LNU because it did not know his true identity or that he was in the U.S.  Mohamed 
LNU later committed a terrorist act against U.S. civilians. 
 





Do you believe that any of the characteristics described above are present in this scenario?  If 
yes, do you believe the characteristic(s) interfered with or had more than nominal affect on U.S. 
law enforcement’s ability to prevent Mohamed LNU from committing the terrorist act?   
 




After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, law enforcement agency #1(A1) and law 
enforcement agency #2 (A2) redirected their respective resources to fight the War on Terror.  A1 
and A2 both had the lawful authority to investigate terrorist financing schemes.  In order to 
coordinate efforts, mitigate duplicative allocation of resources, and wage a seamless law 
enforcement campaign against terrorist financing, A1 and A2 entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU).  The terms of the MOU designated A1 as the “primary” investigative 
agency, whereby A2 would transfer its terrorism-related investigations to A1.  Despite the 
transfer of cases, the MOU sought to create a cooperative climate where agents from A2 
continued to participate in terrorist financing investigations by being assigned to multi-agency 
task force controlled by A1.   
 
After entering the MOU, A2 wrote a T-III wiretap application for a terrorist financing case.  The 
T-III application was forwarded to A1’s local office, the local U.S. Attorney’s Office and the 
Department of Justice’s Counter-Terrorism Section and Office of Enforcement Operation.  Each 
determined that probable cause linking the financing scheme to international terrorism existed.   
Per the MOU, the T-III application was then forwarded to A1’s Headquarters for its concurrence.  
For over three months, A1 needlessly delayed providing its approval.  During this time, more the 
700 communications with a suspected nexus to terrorism were not intercepted.  Ultimately, due to 
A1’s delay, A2 was unable to conduct its investigation and closed its case.  A1 did not pursue the 
investigation.  A1 later admitted that it mishandled the T-III application and the delay should not 
have occurred.  Interviews with persons familiar with the situation stated that in their opinion 
A1’s delay was not based on negligence, but on A1’s desire to protect its turf.  
 
What was or should have been the goal(s) of law enforcement in this scenario?      
 
Do you believe any of the characteristics listed and described above are present in this scenario?  
If yes, do you believe the characteristic(s) interfered with or had more than nominal affect on 
A2’s ability to conduct its investigation? 
 




During 2002, federal law enforcement agency #1 (A1) initiated Operation Highway, an 
international cocaine smuggling investigation jointly conducted with the Mexican government.  
Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between A1 and U.S. law enforcement agency #2 
(A2), A2 had primary jurisdiction in U.S. narcotics cases, therefore, A1 was mandated to notify 
A2 of its investigation and invite A2’s participation.  A1 complied with these requirements and 
A2 joined the investigation. 
 
A1 generated its investigation based on confidential source (CS) information.  CS was a high-
ranking member of the cocaine smuggling cartel.  During the investigation, A2 accused A1 of 
failing to share information gathered from CS.  A2 expressed to A1 that it felt this failure was 
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based on A1’s lack of trust in A2’s agents. As the investigation progressed, A1 did gather 
relevant information from CS that it did not share with A2.  Some of this information pertained to 
CS’ role in a homicide committed in Mexico and that two of A2’s Mexico-based agents had been 
identified by the cartel.  A1 did not share the information with A2 because it was worried that the 
information would detrimentally affect the joint investigation as well as another exclusive A1 
investigation involving illegal cigarettes. 
 
A2 later learned about the information CS provided to A1.  A2 accused A1 of concealing vital 
information, which, had it been disseminated, would have prevented the homicide committed in 
Mexico.   Further, A2 alleged that A1’s failure to share information put the lives of the two A2 
agents and their families at risk.  A2 conducted an emergency evacuation of its agents and their 
families. 
 
What was or should have been the goal(s) of law enforcement in this scenario? 
 
Do you believe any of the characteristics listed and described above are present in this scenario?  
If yes, do you believe the characteristic(s) interfered with or had more than nominal affect on 
how U.S. law enforcement conducted this investigation? 
 




In late-1999, U.S. law enforcement agencies #1 and #2, (A1) and A(2) respectively, initiated an 
OCDETF investigation targeting the smuggling of pseudoephedrine into the U.S. from Canada 
and the unlawful transfer of criminal proceeds from the U.S. to Yemen.  A1 and A2 both have the 
authority to conduct drug and money laundering investigations.  In narcotics offenses, A2 is the 
lead federal agency and has the authority to conduct domestic and international investigations.  
A1 can only conduct narcotics investigations that have an international nexus.  Further, A2 cannot 
conduct money laundering investigations unless the proceeds are generated by the sale of 
narcotics. Nearly every target in the investigation was an immigrant from Yemen. 
 
As the investigation progressed, A2 continually failed to commit its fair share of resources.  
According to A2 agents, they were not interested in pseudoephedrine because it was only a 
precursor chemical, and therefore, less interesting than investigations involving cocaine, heroin or 
methamphetamine.  A1 was prevented from expanding its investigation to include the persons 
manufacturing the methamphetamine due to the domestic nature of the investigation and A2’s 
lack of participation.  
 
In an effort to obtain more agents to support the investigation, A1 sought assistance from U.S. 
law enforcement agency #3 (A3), which had authority to conduct immigration investigations.  A1 
did not have the authority to conduct immigration investigations.  A3 assigned an agent to the 
investigation, but neither this agent nor any other agent from A3 participated in the investigation.   
A1 learned that many of the targets were committing immigration related offenses. When A1’s 
case agent asked A3’s case agent why no one was participating in the investigation, A3’s agent 
stated that A3 was not interested in persons from the Middle East because Mexicans were the 
priority.   
 
A1 concluded its investigation and charged numerous individuals with international drug and 
money violations.   No domestic drug targets were investigated and no immigration violations 
were pursued.  
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What was or should have been the goal(s) of law enforcement in this scenario? 
 
Do you believe any of the characteristics listed and described above are present in this scenario? 
If yes, do you believe the characteristic(s) interfered with or had more than nominal affect on 
A1’s ability to conduct the OCDETF? 
 




Do you think events such as those described above are more likely or less likely to occur in 
federal law enforcement post-9/11…or has 9/11 not changed how federal law enforcement 






 #1(Mohamed LNU) #2 (T-III) #3 (Op Highway) #4 (OCDETF) 
Interagency 
Conflict 
57% 85% 100% 57% 
Redundancy 21% 29% 36% 50% 
Data 
Fragmentation 
71% 0% 50% 36% 
Jurisdictional 
Foreclosure 





















21% 14% 7% 14% 
Professional  
Experience 
93% 79% 79% 57% 
 
Table 2.   Survey Results 
 
The results of the survey indicate that the participants readily identified the 
presence of one or more of the Negative Characteristics in each scenario.  For example, 
57% noted the presence of interagency conflict in Scenario #1 involving Mohamed LNU.  
The totality of the results validates the association of the Negative Characteristics to the 
factual scenarios and, in turn, their correctness as measures of performance for federal 
investigative agencies.  The percentage of participants—93%, 79%, 79%, and 59%—
providing affirmative responses to the professional experience question, Have you 
encountered something similar to this during your career?, supports the proposition that 




law enforcement operations.  This comports with the anecdotal evidence I have heard and 
the actual operations that I have participated in.  Some of the participants’ comments are 
listed below. 
A. Scenario #1 (Mohamed LNU) 
 
The U.S. Intelligence [C]ommunity and the U.S. law enforcement 
community…serve two distinctly different masters.  LE investigates 
criminal matters with a clear goal:  [G]ather evidence and arrest the 
violator.  And although LE also gathers intelligence, it does so with its 
aforementioned goal in mind. 
 
        Participant F2014 
 
I have experienced situations in which Agencies or their members have 
not communicated critical information…In my opinion, lack of 
cooperation usually results from an attitude of “ownership” of 
information or cases to the detriment of the overall goals of the 
investigation. 
 
        Participant K1310 
 
B. Scenario #2 (T-III) 
 
The fact that agencies often don’t work well together has been well 
documented.  Many times they have conflict even when they don’t [have] 
overlapping jurisdiction.  If they have overlapping jurisdiction, the 
potential for conflict is even greater. 
 
        Participant G-186 
 
 
On numbers[sic] occasions in my investigative career “[a]gency egos” 
have greatly assisted Terrorist and criminal organizations. 
 






C. Scenario #3 (Op. Highway) 
 
Yes, and the fault lies with successive Presidents and Congresses who 
created agencies with overlapping jurisdiction…thus creating an 
environment for a wholly natural competition between bureaucracies for 
funds, authority, and most of all, publicity. 
 
        Participant H12 
 
I have not encountered something as serious as presented in the scenario.  
However, I have been in the position of agency A1, where I was in 
possession of information that I intentionally did not share with another 
agency [because] I believed by doing so it would impede my investigation. 
 
        Participant G310 
 
D. Scenario #4 (OCDETF) 
 
It really is what…is happening with these types of investigations.  This 
happens all the time. 
        Participant F1913 
 
I have encountered situations where I was jurisdictional[ly] 
foreclosed…and the agencies that were not foreclosed…participated in the 
investigation in a half-hearted manner [because] it was not a priority for 
them. 
        Participant G310 
 
The evidence collected from this survey confirms the presence and scope of the 
Negative Characteristics in federal law enforcement operations within the Ninth Judicial 
Circuit and by presumption throughout the nation as a whole.  Clearly more in-depth 
study is needed to probe the depth or intensity of this on nationwide basis.  Nevertheless, 
the expectation is that additional study will only corroborate the conclusions drawn upon 
from the data collected herein.   
The last question to address is whether the events of 9/11, which ushered in the 
GWOT Era, and the substantial changes that have come with it, will, if given sufficient 
time, marginalize the negative aspects that exist today within federal law enforcement. 
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Quite simply, the answer is no.  The significance of 9/11 is that it has changed the 
institutional construct of the Big Six and the perspective from which the agencies operate.  
This has set the stage for dialogue, the appetite for change and, most importantly, 
highlighted the true deficiencies.  The GWOT Era did not create the Negative 
Characteristics it just made them more obvious.  Below are some of the Participants 
comments on the subject: 
 
E. POST-9/11 QUESTION  
 
I believe the cooperation is better now than it was pre-9/11.  However, 
interagency cooperation is still pitiful.  Much improvement is needed. 
 
       Participant G186 
 
9/11 has not changed anything regarding interagency conflict, but has 
increased redundancy.  
             Participant G103 
 
Within the arena of investigations relating to terrorism, I believe that the 
scenarios described are less likely to occur post 9/11 [because] there is 
greater recognition within law enforcement that individual agencies 
possess certain authorities and expertise that must, out of necessity, be 
made a part of such investigations.  However, that recognition, and the 
resulting level of cooperation, is tenuous and weakening as we move 
further from the events of 9/11.       
Participant G310 
 
I believe that post 9/11/01 consolidation and refocusing of some federal 
agencies has reduced the propensity for the above listed problems to 
recur.  However, I believe that the problems continue to exist during 
multi-agency investigations. 
       Participant F413 
 
I believe that events such as those described above are less likely to 
happen with respect to Counterterrorism investigations because so much 
emphasis, importance and scrutiny are directed at counterterrorism 
investigations.  Criminally speaking, I believe that instances of 
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interagency conflict, redundancy, data fragmentation and jurisdictional 
foreclosure are just as likely to occur. 
       Participant K1310 
As long as there are multiple agencies with similar or the same mission, 
conflict will continue. 
 
       Participant D1319 
 
9/11 has not changed how federal law enforcement agencies interact. 
 
       Participant H1816 
 
I think the further we get from 9/11, the events described above are more 
likely to happen.  Immediately following 9/11, agencies were under a lot of 
pressure to share information in order to prevent another attack, but I 
think agencies will always do what is in their own interest. 
 
       Participant E516 
 
This last quote identifies the core problem.  Governmental agencies will always 
act to fulfill their own interest.  In situations where these interests intersect, there will be 
a direct correlation between the number of agencies involved and the generation of 
negative byproducts.  In the GWOT Era the Big Six jurisdictions do intersect, therefore 
the presence of the Negative Characteristics will continue and the federal law 
enforcement mission will continue to under-perform.  As discussed previously, there are 
different options that can be undertaken to address this problem, but fully integrating the 
Big Six is arguably the most viable.  However, before such integration occurs, a 





VI. INTEGRATION EVOLUTION 
It will be necessary to grow capabilities in pieces, building on existing 
systems and technologies over time. 
Markle Foundation64   
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the passage of the HLSA and creation of DHS seemed to 
become symbolic surrogates for the Twin Towers.  From an insider’s perspective, the 
sudden and forced integration of diverse federal agencies creates a bureaucratic 
maelstrom and is not a model to follow. The rapid reorganization of twenty-two separate 
agencies within DHS resulted in an under-staffed, under-funded dysfunctional 
department.65  Aside from the rush, a major problem in the creation of DHS was that the 
persons responsible for organizing the department did not have much experience in 
mergers and acquisitions.  
In their article regarding the creation of DHS, Washington Post staff writers 
Susan Glasser and Michael Grunwald interviewed dozens of people involved in the 
formation of DHS and concluded that the department was “designed in secrecy and 
haste…”66  Even more appalling was the small group of mid-level staffers materially 
involved in the process who made seemingly random decisions and apparently did not 
know much about the agencies that they considered and/or ultimately included within the 
new department.67  Inexperience and lack of pre-planning have been identified as two 
major sources of error when performing a merger.68   
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In many ways, it seems that the planners of DHS thought that the mere act of 
creation would generate benefits.  When it comes to planning a merger a number of 
standards have been identified as requisite precursors.  The following list is not exclusive 
nor is it intended that each and every standard be met.  One important caveat about 
mergers is that each “presents its own complex and unique pattern of problems, no 
systematic, detailed set of rules…is now available, or ever likely to be.69  Included in the 
standards are the following: 
(1) integration of common functions; 
(2) the development of specific, realizable operating objectives;  
(3) developing a program for achieving operating benefits;  
(4) basic corporate policies; 
(5) plans for improvement;  
(6) leadership; 
(7) creating a positive atmosphere for change; 
(8) ability to give the new entity time to establish itself.70  
 
In the context of this chapter, a couple of other caveats must also be kept in mind.  
The intent underlying the recommendations made herein is that they not be taken as 
exhaustive.  The Integration Evolution is a framework not a recipe. There are many 
additional issues that will spring from a micro-architectural merger analysis.  The 
integration of major functions usually turns out to be an “extremely complicated and 
delicate maneuver that involves many non-routine decisions.”71 The temporal breadth of 
the Integration Evolution acknowledges this.  However, a central lesson learned from the 
creation of DHS is that it can be done, and presumably with more success given a 
reasonable timeframe.    
There are various types of mergers, but horizontal, vertical and conglomerate are 
the most common.  A horizontal merger is the combining of similar “industry” entities.72  
                                                 
69 Forrest D. Wallace, “Some Principles of Acquisition,” The Corporate Merger, (Chicago:  The 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 178. 
70 Ibid, 166–175. 
71 Ibid, 173. 
72 Allan, “Expansion by Merger,” 101. 
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In the law enforcement context, the creation of ICE from the former investigative offices 
of the INS and USCS provides an example. ICE was created through the merger of the 
investigative assets from the INS and the USCS.  Though ICE has multiple divisions, 
including the non-investigative entities such as the Office of Intelligence, Federal 
Protective Service, Forensic Document Laboratory, and the Office of Detention and 
Removal, it is the Office of Investigations that makes ICE DHS’ largest investigative 
agency.  
A vertical merger is the combining of industry related, yet separate interest 
agencies.73  In the law enforcement context, the proposed merger of ICE with its sister 
DHS agency, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is an example.  CBP is a regulatory 
and interdiction agency while ICE is an investigative agency. There has been much 
discussion about the prospect of merging ICE and CBP.  Recently, the DHS Inspector 
General issued a report calling for the merger of the two agencies.  The Inspector General 
found no good reason for bifurcating the customs and immigration functions between two 
agencies and that the separation of ICE and CBP has led to “the articulation of 
mismatched priorities, competition, and, at times, operational inflexibility.”74  The 
presumption that the merger of ICE and CBP would create synergy is not shared by 
Secretary Chertoff, who rejected the idea as part of the Second Stage Review.    
Conglomerate merger is the most diversified method of acquisition and can be 
thought of as a “shotgun” approach to expansion.  In this type of merger, entities with 
little or no industry relation are merged together.  The advantage of a conglomerate 
merger is that it is the fastest way to “enter” into a new market.  The disadvantage is that 
there are inherent difficulties with integrating the myriad entities that are merged.  The 
diversity of organizations involved in this type of merger makes it the riskiest and most 
likely to fail.75  
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The creation of DHS can be broadly regarded as a conglomerate acquisition since 
it involved the merger of twenty-two agencies from a vast array of disciplines.  In reality, 
it involved all three types in what can be considered a “Big Bang” merger.   In fact, the 
creation of DHS—no matter what you think of it—was quite a feat and can be 
conceptualized as “entry” into the new market of Homeland Defense and Security.  
However, a review of the merged agencies reflects the confluence of a vast array of 
tangentially related disciplines and, thus, the intersection of more than one industry. The 
twenty-two entities merged into DHS were: 
• Immigration and Naturalization Service; 
• United States Customs Service; 
• Federal Protective Service; 
• Transportation Security Administration; 
• Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; 
• Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; 
• Office for Domestic Preparedness; 
• Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
• Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System; 
• Nuclear Incident Response Team; 
• Domestic Emergency Support Teams; 
• National Domestic Preparedness Office; 
• CBRN Countermeasures Programs; 
• Environmental Measurements Laboratory; 
• National BW Defense Analysis Center; 
• Plum Island Animal Disease Center; 
• Federal Computer Incident Response Center; 
• National Communications System; 
• National Infrastructure Protection Center; 
• Energy Security and Assurance Program; 
• Secret Service; 
• Coast Guard.76   
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The integration of the Big Six is not comparable to that of DHS for a number of 
reasons.  First it involves far fewer entities from far fewer fields.  Secondly, it represents 
a horizontal not a Big Bang or conglomerate merger. Therefore, it would involve the 
most simplistic form of merger as horizontal organization is the most basic characteristic 
of specialized activity.77   Also, temporally speaking, the merger would be premeditated 
and deliberate, two characteristics seemingly absent from the DHS plan.  The integrative 
path of the Big Six would occur incrementally over a period of five to seven years. This 
Integration Evolution is a multi-phased horizontal merger that places an emphasis on 
analyzing the standards (1)–(8) listed above, with the specific intent of minimizing many 
of the malignant consequences that derive from bringing disparate groups together.   
From my own experience, I have identified Recognition, Coordination, 
Collaboration, Community, Consolidation and Merger as the six phases of Integration 
Evolution.   These phases are defined as follows: 
1) Recognition—Confirmation of existence.  In the law enforcement context 
this occurs when one agency acknowledges that another agency has the authority 
to perform a particular act, such as the FBI noting that ICE has border search 
authority and it does not. 
2) Coordination—The act of adjusting in order accommodate concurrent 
jurisdiction.  An example of this in the law enforcement context would be when 
the California Highway Patrol and the San Francisco Police Department agree 
upon areas each will primarily patrol in regard to the San Francisco roadways 
over which both have jurisdiction. 
3) Collaboration—The act of working together in a joint operation.  Agency 
participation in a Task Force and the Memorandums of Understanding between 
various Big Six agencies are examples of this. 
4) Community—The act or process of openly sharing resources or 
information amongst several entities with some restriction.  In the context of 
Integration Evolution, this would occur when the Big Six agencies continue to 
maintain their identity and administration, yet begin to institute cross-agency 
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assignment of senior agents and low to middle managers and unrestricted access 
to information for which there is a proper clearance and need-to-know. 
5) Consolidation—The act or process of uniting several entities.  In the 
context of Integration Evolution this would occur when the Big Six are 
transferred to the Department of Justice and begin to institute unified 
recruitment/hiring, training and policy though continuing to maintain their 
respective agency identity.  
6) Merger—The fusion of disparate entities.  In the context of Integration 
Evolution this would occur when the Big Six cease to exist, come to occupy 
distinct divisions within the newly constituted FBI.78  
The first three, Recognition, Coordination and Collaboration currently and 
frequently happen.  As mentioned in prior chapters, Task Forces exist on all levels of law 
enforcement.  Task Forces represent a quasi-merger of law enforcement officers from the 
local, state and federal levels who form a coalition in order to marshal their respective 
enforcement strengths.  At the most basic level, an officer is assigned to a task force in 
order to collaborate with officers from other agencies so he can learn new things and 
ultimately enhance the effectiveness of his own agency.  Unfortunately, it is typical for an 
agency not to fully commit its officer to the task force and require him to report through 
his agency chain-of-command not the task forces’.  By maintaining a proprietary interest 
over the officer, the agency also maintains a proprietary interest over its information and 
restricts access to it and dissemination of it.   
In the context of Integration Evolution, the task force concept is an 
acknowledgement by the participating agency that extra-agency resources are needed to 
best fulfill a mission.  It is a passive/aggressive recognition of the need to merge.  It is 
aggressive insofar as an agency assigns officers and dedicates resources, and passive 
because of the proprietary rope each agency casts around its assets, which is ready to be 
pulled back when the needs of the agency supersede the needs of the task force.  Further, 
it maintains the status quo.  Each agency maintains identity and managerial positions 
remain secure because they are not superfluous in a segregated scheme. 
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In order to facilitate the horizontal interoperability of the Big Six a Community 
must be recognized.  A Community is best described as an intangible coalition where the 
members place special significance and standing upon the other members.  This special 
status provides the foundation for the lessening or removal of information sharing 
restrictions and influx of cross-agency assignments.  During the Community phase the 
countenance of agency identity and infrastructure remain. In the Federal Law 
Enforcement Community, the Big Six would all continue to exist, but would be able to 
access the data possessed by the others.  
One of the most attractive qualities of the Community integration from a 
technological perspective is that it can be accomplished with minimal cost relative to the 
creation of a new system and accomplished in a timely manner.79 As the FBI recently 
learned in its attempt to modernize its aging technology infrastructure, upgrading an 
existing system can be costly and time consuming.  Prior to 9/11, the FBI began its 
Trilogy project, which incorporated an agency wide upgrade of its desktop hardware and 
software, deployment of a modern network infrastructure and an integrated suite of 
software for entering, finding, sharing and analyzing casework.80 
Unfortunately, after nearly five years and half a billion dollars, Trilogy has not 
had an impact on the FBI’s antiquated case management system.81  In fact, Director 
Robert Mueller was forced to admit to a senate committee that the project will not 
succeed and alternative solutions are being examined.82    Though agency integration will 
not solve the FBI’s dilemma, the lessons learned from the Trilogy experience provide an 
instructive cautionary tale.  
One of the major disadvantages to the integration model described herein is the 
inefficiency associated with the operation of connected, yet separately maintained 
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systems.  It is important to note that the integration of the disparate agency databases is 
not meant to supplant the creation of a unified technological system that would be shared 
by all the agencies or agency, depending on what phase of evolution the Big Six are in.  
However, creation of a single database is a long term project.  
Another major step occurring during the Community phase is the cross-agency 
assignment of senior agents and low to middle managers.  Of the pre-merger standards 
(1)-(8) noted above, almost half can be aggressively addressed during this phase.  These 
standards include the integration of common functions, learning about the basic policies 
of sister agencies, leadership and, most importantly, creating a positive atmosphere for 
change.  This last standard cannot be overemphasized.   
One of the main missteps that occurred in the creation of ICE was the failure to 
quantify the impacts of tangible and intangible resistance.  All things are vulnerable to 
malice and superficial judgment.   Thus, the insecurity and non-malevolent reluctance 
amongst the employees of the Big Six must be contended with.  Of course, malevolent 
reluctance must also be anticipated both on the institutional and personal level.  
Organizational politics is an inescapable reality of corporate and public 
life.  Even if an organization has reached the tipping point of execution, 
there exist powerful vested interests that will resist the impending 
changes.   
Blue Ocean Strategy83  
In their book, Blue Ocean Strategy, W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne studied 
how over one hundred and fifty companies from a wide range of industries went about 
effectuating change.  Amongst the insights that they gleaned from their study was the 
concept of tipping-point strategy.  Tipping-point strategy is based on the concept that 
“fundamental changes can happen quickly when the beliefs and energies of a critical 
mass of people create an epidemic movement toward an idea.”84   The key question then  
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becomes, who makes up this critical mass?  Kim and Mauborgne identify key personnel, 
designated as Kingpins, who are people inside each organization that are natural leaders 
and have the ability to influence.85   
In the context of the Big Six Community phase, these persons will come from the 
senior agent and low to middle management range.  This is why these people must be 
given cross-agency assignments.  Having personally participated in a cross-agency 
assignment, I can attest to the value of these endeavors. Introduction into a different 
operating environment allows parties on both sides to access their respective strengths 
and weaknesses.  Typically, personal resistance is rooted in superficial judgments, 
insecurity, fear of change and loss of identity.  Cross-agency assignments allow Kingpins 
to address these barriers within their own agencies.   
Ultimately, much of the intangible resistance will be addressed two other ways.  
The first is that forced integration through mandatory cross-agency assignment will not 
be done.  That is, agents from one legacy agency will not be forced into an assignment 
with another legacy agency.  For example, a DEA agent will not be non-volitionally 
transferred to an ICE Cyber Crimes Group or FBI White Collar Crimes Squad.  This 
policy should be maintained for a few years after the merger.  This will give everyone 
plenty of time to come to terms with their new reality.   
Truly, the identity of a reconstituted FBI will rise from below not fall from above. 
Once the agencies are transferred from their respective departments into DOJ the 
consolidation phase will have begun.  During this phase, a unified recruitment and hiring 
scheme will take effect.  New Agent-Candidates will begin to attend the same basic 
training academy.   After completing this training, an Agent-Candidate will select or be 
selected for assignment and additional training in one of the designated divisions. 
As noted above, the Big Six are presently ready to enter the Community phase.  
Thus, the five to seven year timetable will truly be devoted to the Consolidation and 
Merger phases.   In order to facilitate each transition an Integration Engineer and 
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Integration Committee must be established.  The Integration Engineer should be a DOJ 
official since it is the end destination department.  The engineer will be the Officer-In-
Charge of the Integration Evolution and be assisted by an Integration Committee that will 
consist of a delegate from each Big Six agency.  It is expected that each Big Six agency, 
especially the FBI, will assign their own personnel to agency subcommittees.   
Of course, the FBI will play a critical role in this process since it is the end 
destination agency.  Admittedly, a whole new agency or other Big Six member could be 
the end destination agency, but the FBI makes the most sense for a number of reasons.  
First, it is the biggest Big Six agency in terms of jurisdiction, budget and personnel.  
Second, the FBI is the most notorious of the Big Six agencies.  In my experience, most 
people are unfamiliar with the actual structure of federal law enforcement agencies and 
already think the Special Agents from other Big Six agencies are part of the FBI.  Third, 
and most importantly, the FBI has the most political clout.  “Invention calls on two quite 
different kinds of knowledge:  [K]nowledge about needs to be filled and knowledge 
about things that can be done.”86  It is expected that if the FBI was not targeted for 
growth and notoriety, its tangible resistance would create an insurmountable barrier to 
this proposal. 
During the consolidation phase, and in preparation for the merger phase, the Big 
Six’s missions will become streamlined in a Progressive like fashion.  During this phase 
two important functions will occur.   The substance and/or breadth of investigation 
performed by each Big Six agency will be modified to mirror the divisional role that it 
will fulfill once merged.   
For agencies like DEA or IRS this should mean relatively little since each could 
respectively absorb the drug enforcement and financial crimes missions.  For multi-
program agencies like ICE, FBI and ATF certain programs will cease to be enforced 
while others are expanded.  For example, ATF will expand its Arson and Explosives role, 
while loosing its Alcohol and Tobacco programs, which can be absorbed by either an ICE 
Merchandise Fraud Group or FBI General Crimes Squad.  ICE and the FBI will cease to  
 
                                                 




investigate narcotics related offenses and their money laundering and white collar 
programs will begin to align with the IRS in what will upon merger come to occupy the 
Financial Crimes Division of the FBI.   
Of course, the USSS is an agency caught in the middle.   Since Executive 
Protection is a non-investigative duty neither this function nor the USSS will become part 
of the newly reconstituted FBI.  The expectation is that the USSS will be partitioned, 
with its protective-detail remaining in DHS and its counterfeiting program transferred to 
the FBI.   This can happen one of two ways.  The preferred method is that a contingent of 
USSS personnel be transferred to the FBI and populate an Identity Theft and 
Counterfeiting Division.  This way expertise and continuity can be maintained.  The other 
way is to just transfer the jurisdiction to the FBI without any personnel.  Ultimately, the 
Integration Engineer and Integration Committee will form recommendations for the 
President and Congress on the divisional configuration.   
Ultimately, the Integration Engineer and Integration Committee will have to 
consider many topics not addressed in this paper. Again, the purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a framework for merging the Big Six.  The Integration Evolution provides a 
pragmatic approach for successfully accomplishing this task.  As discussed in the next 
chapter, one major topic that needs to be addressed during this process is whether the 
strategic plan for a reconstituted FBI should encompass the FBI’s current plan to become 
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VII. THE FOCUSED MISSION 
Terrorists still plot their evil deeds, and nature’s unyielding power will 
continue. We know with certainty that there will be tragedies in our 
future.87 
 
A. INVESTIGATIVE VERSUS INTELLIGENCE CULTURES 
A central strategic plan regarding the integration of the Big Six incorporates the 
idea that a reconstituted FBI should not meld intelligence and investigative functions.  
These functions should be performed by separate entities.  The segregation of these 
functions will enhance a reconstituted FBI’s ability to fulfill its base investigative 
mission.  Therefore, the responsibility of gathering, analyzing and disseminating the 
nation’s domestic intelligence product should be performed by a singularly dedicated 
agency.  The responsibility should fall somewhere else, possibly within DHS, where a 
domestic all-source intelligence group could be formed. 
The natural follow-up question is how can a law enforcement agency seek to 
prevent crime without intelligence? Clearly, deterrent, preemptive and preventative law 
enforcement efforts cannot materialize without pertinent information.  However, 
intelligence is more than gathering information.  Many commentators believe that even 
with the many changes the FBI has made, inherent structural and cultural factors will 
prevent it from generating an intelligence cycle.88  
There are multiple stages that comprise the intelligence cycle: Planning and 
direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis, dissemination, and 
consumption.  Feedback from the policymakers and consumers at each stage of the 
process keeps the integration of the stages balanced.89  In a purely investigative context, a 
law enforcement agency does not need to complete each stage of the cycle because the 
gathering of evidence or “collection” stage is its primary mission.   
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The real problem for hybrid investigative/intelligence agencies is the inherent 
conflict between the disciplines.  The natural tendency of an investigative agency is to 
collect evidence and openly publish it.   Another conflict is of a temporal nature.  Law 
enforcement agencies are bound by laws that require them to act within particular 
timeframes.  Examples of this are statutes of limitations and the Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial.90   
Thus, even if a law enforcement agency is tasked with intelligence collection, the 
natural consequence is that the intelligence it collects, analyzes, etc, will probably regard 
the short term.  This minimizes forward thinking, long term “trend” intelligence, which is 
vital to counterterrorism, especially groups like Al Qaeda whose plans take a long time to 
gestate.  Further, if the law enforcement agency takes a long term outlook, it is 
abandoning the response standard of its mission.  Therefore, a domestic intelligence 
product created by a law enforcement agency is going to marginalize either the 
intelligence or investigative mission it seeks to perform and perhaps both.     
Intelligence involves segments of data collection, processing, analysis, production 
and dissemination that are performed by agencies that have specified capabilities or 
functions.  Many of these tasks are technologically complex and foster specialization 
within the Intelligence Community (IC).  In comparison, the investigative techniques 
employed by the Big Six are more pedestrian and universally applied making the skill set 
of its agents more common and its agents more fungible.  If law enforcement can be 
thought of as a two-dimensional endeavor then intelligence is three-dimensional.   
The differences between the two disciplines are also evidenced by the fact that the 
same performance standards cannot be used to measure their functionality.  Recall in 
Chapter IV, the Five Standards and Negative Characteristics were used to reveal the 
dysfunction of the Big Six.  While the Five Standards are universal measures for 
government agency performance—albeit with differing degrees of meaning depending on 
the agency—the same cannot be said of the Negative Characteristics.  The                                                  
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characteristics, which negatively impact Big Six investigations, are not entirely suitable 
metrics for gauging the affect of intelligence operations.  For example, the Negative 
Characteristics of redundancy and interagency rivalry are encouraged in the field of 
intelligence where “competitive analysis” performs the academic function of testing 
theories.  It is through this intellectual engagement that asymmetric, anti-“group-think” 
prospers.  In this context, repetition of action and a competitive atmosphere promote 
efficiency and effectiveness in ways that are destructive in an investigative setting.  
Debate regarding the differences between the two disciplines is not new.  
Basically, policy analysts have broadly formed the discussion of this issue into two 
camps.  In their paper on intelligence reform implementation, Alfred Cumming and Todd 
Masse identify the two camps as the (i) Optimists/Synergists and (ii) Skeptics and 
describe them as follows: 
The optimists/ “synergists” recognize that the events of 9/11 represented a 
substantial shock to the FBI’s traditional priorities and culture.  They 
argue, however, that the FBI has developed a coherent and sound vision 
for an intelligence program that integrates and leverages what they assert 
is a synergy between the FBI’s criminal and national security missions. 91 
The skeptics believe that there is some limited synergy between the 
disciplines of law enforcement and intelligence with respect to terrorism 
fund-raising, but they doubt it extends to other issues. Moreover, they 
contend the benefits of a focused and integrated intelligence program 
would far outweigh the intangible benefits derived from any existing 
synergy.  As a result, skeptics of the FBI’s approach believe the FBI’s 
vision for intelligence reform is fundamentally flawed.92  
Many well respected U.S. commentators and commissions have adopted this 
bifurcated, diametric Cummings/Masse framework.  In his article, “Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S.” Richard Best examines the 
coherent and sound vision sought by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies as 
each addresses U.S. security concerns stemming from the transnational threats that 
terrorism, narcotics smuggling, and WMD present.  Best notes “that the continuing lack 
of clarity about relationships among U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies and 
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their roles and missions may reduce the effectiveness of their individual and collective 
efforts and lead to waste and duplication of effort.”93 
The core of Best’s argument focuses on the difficulty inherent in coordinating law 
enforcement and intelligence functions.  He explains that there is a natural dichotomy 
between the missions, expectations, methods and oversight associated with each group.  
For example, law enforcement’s expectation is that wrongdoers will be arrested and 
punished.  In order to accomplish this goal, law enforcement must follow strict guidelines 
on how it gathers information/evidence.  A law enforcement officer is cognizant that his 
actions are or will be open for public consumption and scrutiny.  In contrast, an 
intelligence officer’s mission is to collect information so that something can be learned.  
This activity can be performed with no concern that the methods or product will be 
publicly exposed.94   
Best’s position directly comports with the Skeptics position that the nation’s 
investigative and intelligence functions should be segregated.  Though he does not 
explicitly endorse the creation of a domestic all-source intelligence group his premise 
logically supports it.  However, direct support for the proposition can be found in the 
Markle Foundation’s October 2002 report, which presents the most directed policy 
recommendation on how to effectuate the Skeptic’s view: 
The foundation’s basic conception is that the Department of Justice and its 
FBI should be the lead agencies for law enforcement, exercising the power 
to investigate crimes, charge people with crimes, perhaps take away their 
liberty, and prepare cases for trial and appeal. The DHS should be the lead 
agency for shaping domestic intelligence products to inform policymakers, 
especially on the analytical side, so that there is some separation between 
the attitudes and priorities of intelligence analysis and the different, more 
concentrated, focus of law enforcement personnel authorized to use force 
on the street to make arrests and pursue or detain citizens. 
We understand that criminal investigation (and counterintelligence) often 
overlaps with intelligence work.  Some overlap is natural and good.  But 
the case for a fundamental separation is strong.  Intelligence has much 
broader purposes than criminal investigation.  The operational objectives 
are different.  The training is different.  The rules about how to collect, 
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retain, and share information are different.  The relationships with sources 
of information are different.95  [Italics added] 
The Markle Task Force identified three vital components that help explain the 
cultural differences between investigative and intelligence cultures.  The objectives, 
training, and rules are all materially different for investigative and intelligence agencies.  
Of the three components, the rules are perhaps most significant.  The methods law 
enforcement agencies use to complete their mission face greater constitutional and 
statutory scrutiny than those of intelligence agencies.   
Take a generic narcotics investigation where the police use a confidential source 
to infiltrate Seller.  The police use the source to purchase narcotics and provide 
information that can be used in a Search Warrant affidavit.  After obtaining enough 
information to satisfy a judge that probable cause exists, the police execute the search 
warrant and gather more evidence to support an arrest.  At the outset of the search, the 
police must present a copy of the search warrant and list of items to be seized to the target 
of investigation.96  The police then present the evidence to a prosecutor who determines 
if enough evidence exists to convince a judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Seller is guilty.  If the prosecutor charges Seller, the prosecutor must make all the 
evidence that will be presented during the main part of the trial, and any exculpatory 
evidence that may or may not be presented at trial, available to Seller’s attorney who will 
then share the information with Seller.  If the case proceeds to trial, Seller’s Sixth 
Amendment right to “public” trial will ensure an open forum for full disclosure.  Thus, 
law enforcements’ sources and methods will not only be publicized, but subject to 
scrutiny by various courts and members of the defense bar.   
Intelligence agencies thrive on secrecy and spying, two characteristics that are 
like kryptonite to the transparency and accountability required of investigative 
operations.  Intelligence operators do not seek absolute standards like truth or justice, but 
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a conjecture based “proximate reality.”97  Best-guesses do not comport with the standards 
or burdens of proof that law enforcement officers must meet.  
Intelligence agencies seek to gather information with few legal constraints and 
manipulate it for value.  In contrast, the objectives of U.S. investigative agencies are to 
identify, infiltrate, and dismantle criminal enterprises in an open manner.  Also, there is 
an expected terminus to a criminal investigation, whereas there is no natural or legal end 
to an intelligence operation.98  Thus, there are significant substantive and procedural 
chasms between the two disciplines.     
Despite such meaningful differences, two well recognized commissions have not 
supported the creation of a single discipline domestic intelligence agency.  The highly 
influential 9/11 Commission Report juxtaposes the Markle Report in many ways and 
offers an extremely credible encapsulation of the Optimist/Synergist position.  
Specifically, the report differs from the Markle position in two key areas.  First, the 
commission argues against the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency, and 
second, it recommends that the FBI continue on its path to become the nation’s domestic 
intelligence agency.  Among its stated reasons are that the FBI currently conducts 
sensitive intelligence collection operations and the creation of a new agency would 
exacerbate existing information-sharing problems.99   
The 9/11 Commission’s recommendation is well articulated and reasoned, yet 
after reading the report, one gets the impression that the commission’s support of the FBI 
is more about maintaining the status quo than achieving an optimal work-product.  The 
9/11 Commission’s endorsement of the FBI seems less rooted in faith than in practicality.  
This sentiment is more evidently expressed in the WMD Commission Report. 
In March 2005, the WMD Commission issued an extensive report that contained 
seventy-four recommendations for improving the U.S. Intelligence Community. Like the 
9/11 Commission, it considered and rejected the creation of a domestic intelligence 
agency: 
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(I)n today’s world of transnational threats, the line between “criminal 
activity” and “national security information” is increasingly 
blurred…Ensuring continuing coordination between the FBI’s two halves 
is critical for at least two reasons: such coordination is necessary to 
optimize the FBI’s performance in both national security and criminal 
investigations, and—equally important—it will ensure continued attention 
to civil liberties and legal limits on the power of government to intrude 
into the lives of citizens.100 
Thus, the WMD Commission embraced the Optimist/Synergist idea that the FBI’s 
hybrid nature is one of its strengths.  In much the same way as the Markle Report, the 
WMD Commission acutely recommended an effective solution that would assist in 
realizing its vision.  It recommended that the FBI create a new National Security Service 
(NSS), which would include the FBI’s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence 
Divisions as well as its Directorate of Intelligence.  The NSS would fall under the 
authority of the DNI.  
Despite its strong endorsement for the creation of the NSS, the WMD 
Commission, later, tempered its position, holding;  
despite the many benefits associated with having a combined law 
enforcement and intelligence agency, we recommend that policymakers 
re-evaluate the wisdom of creating a separate agency—an equivalent to 
the British ‘MI-5’…dedicated to intelligence collection in the United 
States…”101   
The commission qualified its primary recommendation because it doubted the 
FBI’s ability to create an effective intelligence agency. Given the FBI’s past failures in 
the areas of counterintelligence and counterterrorism, it must improve its domestic 
abilities.102  This may be easier said than done.  The commission found that the FBI has 
attempted and failed to restructure itself: 
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Past efforts to build a strong intelligence capability within the FBI…Failed 
in quick succession as a result of strong resistance from the FBI’s 
operational divisions and an intelligence architecture that could not defend 
itself inside the bureaucracy.  Several of the obstacles (the) FBI has faced 
in reforming itself stem from the Bureau’s long and proud law 
enforcement culture.103 
One can only surmise how the FBI’s inbred law enforcement culture will react to 
the creation of the NSS.  It is quite possible that the design will create an internal power 
struggle between the investigative and intelligence divisions as they vie for substantive 
and budgetary control.  Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform Act, the FBI divides its 
budget into four parts: intelligence, counterterrorism/counterintelligence, criminal justice 
services and criminal enterprises/federal crimes.104  With the NSS, the four parts will 
presumably become three since the intelligence and counterterrorism/counterintelligence 
budgets will be combined.  Only time will tell how the criminal divisions of the FBI will 
adapt to this change in priority.  Conflict between the two is probable.  It is foreseeable 
the conflict could lead to a self-imposed detachment between the branches.  If such an 
event were to occur, the semi-autonomous intelligence division would become a de facto 
domestic intelligence agency.  This would effectively fuse both the Optimist/Synergist 
and Skeptic positions and, quite possibly, marginalize the strengths of each.   With the 
NSS dually reporting to the DNI and the FBI director the recipe for friction is set.    
 
B. COMPARATIVE MODELS 
The overarching measure of comparative national domestic intelligence agency 
models and their effectiveness centers on the issue of terrorism and how different nations 
counter it.  This presents a couple of troublesome issues:  One being that there is no 
settled definition of terrorism within the U.S. or internationally.  Secondly, every 
country’s history and experience is unique.  Thus, despite the similarities or 
dissimilarities the U.S may have with other nations, parallel institutional analysis may not 
be very rewarding.105  That being said, it is hard to dismiss the manner in which other 
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countries have modeled themselves.  Especially countries like the United Kingdom, 
Canada, France, Germany, Australia and Israel, which have closely related liberal 
democratic traditions that are also challenged by transnational criminal organizations and 
Islamic fueled terrorism.    
The difficulty in understanding the full effect of terrorism may be the difficulty in 
ascertaining its meaning.  The problem with defining the term is that it has subjective and 
objective components.  Victims of an attack may define it one way while perpetrators 
define it another.   However, a detailed discussion of the definition is not incorporated 
herein since an exact definition will not materially affect the institutional construct 
needed by the U.S. to fulfill its domestic intelligence needs. 
Sociologically nations digest the threat of terrorism quite differently.  The U.S is 
arguably the world’s number one terrorist target, but its national existence is really not 
threatened by terrorism.  In contrast, Israel’s counterterrorism capabilities truly affect the 
viability of the state.106   France, with its recent socio-religious riots and a large Muslim 
population is beginning to recognize this prospect.  Perhaps this helps explain why the 
French and Israelis conceptualize terrorism in existential terms and as a phenomenon that 
is part of the human condition. 107  This is in stark contrast to the U.S., which views 
terrorism as a temporal nuisance manifested in a quantifiable enemy that cannot sustain 
itself in the face of adequate force. 
A country’s intelligence services are products of its unique history, political 
structures and socio-cultural expectations of privacy.    In his book, Intelligence: From 
Secrets to Policy, U.S. intelligence official Mark M. Lowenthal, hypothesizes that 
modeling one nation’s domestic intelligence architecture after another’s is not a 
productive exercise because each service must fulfill the unique intelligence requirements  
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of its national policymakers.108  The logical extension of Lowenthal’s position is that 
domestic intelligence agency configuration should be as diverse or unique as the nation it 
serves.  
If Lowenthal is correct, it must be true that the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Australia, Israel and Canada have similar policy requirements since all have 
created singularly dedicated non-law enforcement intelligence agencies.  Inversely, if 
they are dissimilar, their domestic intelligence configurations must therefore be flawed.   
It is difficult to argue that these nations’ agencies are flawed when many of these 
countries developed their single discipline intelligence agencies after learning that law 
enforcement and intelligence do not mix well.109  (Thus, unlike the recommendations of 
the 9/11 and WMD Commissions these decisions were based on experience not the path 
of least resistance.)  Likewise, it is difficult to say that these countries have similar policy 
needs.  For example, the United Kingdom is the only European nation mentioned that has 
not adopted the Euro as its currency, which indicates a socio-economic policy difference.  
Further, none of these countries faces the threat of potentially imminent extinction like 
the Israelis.  Thus, these countries are dissimilar, but not flawed within the context 
discussed herein.  Therefore, Lowenthal’s hypothesis can be judged as oversimplified.   
The fact that the U.K., Germany, France, Australia, Israel and Canada have single 
discipline domestic intelligence agencies suggests that some known or otherwise 
unknown objective criterion exist.  The existence of objective criterion suggests that the 
desire to segregate investigative and intelligence missions is purposive not random.  The 
million dollar question is what are the objective factors?     
A pre-9/11 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report examined this issue 
and compared the intelligence and law enforcement structures of the U.S., United 
Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany and Israel.  A similar report, published in 2004, by 
Peter Chalk and William Rosenau titled, “Confronting the ‘Enemy Within,’” conducted 
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an examination including the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Australia.  
Combining each report’s findings helps to broaden the comparative spectrum.110  
Following is a table of each nation’s law enforcement and domestic intelligence 
structure: 
 
            Post 9/11 Terror    Law Enforcement  Intelligence 
  Threat    Structure  Structure 
U.S.   Primarily Islamic;  Diffused;   Dual Discipline 
  Attacked home/abroad  State/local counterparts 
  
U.K.  Primarily Islamic;  Decentralized;  Single Discipline 
  Attacked home/abroad  Regional partners 
 
France  Primarily Islamic;  Centralized  Single Discipline 
  Civil unrest; attempted  
  attacks 
 
Germany Primarily Islamic;  Centralized;  Single Discipline 
  Not attacked/attack  Regional counterparts 
  planned 
 
Canada  Primarily Islamic;  Centralized  Single Discipline 
  Not attacked/attack  
  Planned/sanctuary  
 
Israel  Primarily Islamic;  Centralized  Single Discipline 
  Attacked home/abroad 
 
Australia     Primarily Islamic;  Centralized  Single Discipline 
  Attacked abroad  
 
Table 3.   Seven Nation Law Enforcement and Domestic Intelligence Structure 
 
Reviewing these structures, the predominant characteristic is that the majority of 
countries have a centralized national police force.  Thus, for these countries, it seems 
complementary and well compartmented to have a centralized or dedicated intelligence 
service to act as a counterpart.  Unlike the FBI,  France’s Direction de la Surveillance du 
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fur Verfassungsschutz, Australia’s Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and 
Israel’s Security Agency-Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali (Shin Bet) have no arrest 
powers.111   
A natural conclusion may be to think that the reason the U.S. opted for a hybrid 
investigative/intelligence service model is because it does not have a centralized federal 
law enforcement structure. This is a misleading deduction.  Though the U.S.’ national 
law enforcement structure is not centralized, it comprised of multiple law enforcement 
agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, i.e., the Big Six.  Therefore, it is more diffused 
than decentralized.  Further, from a national perspective, the U.S. is federally weighted, 
despite the plethora of state and local police agencies.  Also, the concurrent existence of 
local and state law enforcement entities does not appear to be a factor inhibiting the 
creation of a dedicated domestic intelligence agency.  The U.K., Canada and Germany 
also have regional counterparts.112  As discussed below, the existence of regional 
counterparts may be one of the most compelling reasons for redesigning our intelligence 
paradigm: 
[M]uch of the Federal government, Congress, and the Nation at large have 
continued to think about terrorism and natural disasters as if they are 
competing priorities... The lessons of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina are that 
we cannot choose one or the other type of disaster.  We must be prepared 
for all-hazards.113 
The U.S. is a melting pot of ideas, races, cultures and problems, both natural and 
man-made.  It also has an integrated federalist political structure that relies upon local, 
state, and federal commitment.   It has been widely recognized that local and state 
agencies from various disciplines to include military, law enforcement, fire, and health, 
stand on the frontline in this new era.   In the U.S., neither the Optimists/Synergists nor 
Skeptics have embraced the conceptual breadth of homeland security and therefore the  
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U.S.’ domestic intelligence needs.  Before the U.S. can fully engage in domestic 
intelligence it must better understand and accept its needs and the weaknesses those 
needs reveal.   
To intelligently address the complexity of its domestic threats, the U.S. needs to 
consider the development of an all-hazards, all-source intelligence group so that the 
efforts of the myriad constituent agencies can be enveloped in a meaningful way.   With 
twenty-two agencies dedicated to homeland defense and security, DHS provides a good 
foundation for the placement of a new domestic intelligence group.  In the area of 
intelligence, DHS is poised to operate as a central repository for domestic intelligence 
concerns.   
Thus, a domestic intelligence agency will be expected to not only fuse the various 
aspects that threaten local, state and federal security, it must also interact with the other 
members of the Intelligence Community.  In its 2005 report, the WMD Commission 
found that “DHS is the primary repository for information about what passes in and out 
of the country,” and makes DHS “a critical player safeguarding the United States from 
nuclear, biological, or chemical attack.” 114   
An instructive model for policymakers is found in Los Angeles County’s 
Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), which provides a good model of how to 
coalesce the multiple disciplines that contribute to an all-hazards strategy.  The TEW is 
an emergent concept based on a horizontal and vertical network model that seeks to fuse 
the resources and information from the various agencies responsible for deterring, 
preempting, preventing, protecting and responding to public harms.  Agencies from the 
fields of law enforcement, fire, health and emergency management contribute to the 
TEW.  This public service “cooperative” could be adopted on the federal level.   As noted 
in the previous chapter, this would be a critical area for the Integration Engineer and 
Integration Committee to consider.  Since a detailed analysis of the TEW concept is not 
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incorporated in this paper, the author recommends the thesis of the Naval Postgraduate 
School Master’s graduate Michael Grossman as a starting point.115    
In this paper, the creation of a federal TEW is a secondary concern to that of the 
separation of investigative and intelligence duties within a reconstituted FBI.  To date, 
DHS has not gained much standing within the IC, which makes the implementation of a 
federal TEW less likely even though it appears to be the most effective option 
considering our threat spectrum and federalist political structure.  While there may be 
many contributing factors as to why, one factor is that the policy option parameters have 
been constrained to the Optimist/Synergist—Skeptic dialogue.  The threat spectrum is 
about more than Al Qaeda, and thus, the nation’s intelligence apparatus needs to be about 
more than counterterrorism.   
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VIII. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
The essence of the American genius is that we know better than most 
societies how to reinvent ourselves to meet the times.116 
 
The above quote from the Hart-Rudman Commission is both ironic and prophetic.  
The commission’s recommendation to create a National Homeland Security Agency to 
help defend against expected “attacks against American citizens on American soil,” came 
some seven months before the 9/11-attacks.117  Though the prescient recommendation 
and threat analysis were not acted upon in a timely manner, perhaps one benefit has been 
a national reluctance to turn a blind eye to change.  In the GWOT Era, the U.S. has been 
forced to confront fallibility and acknowledge that lack of foresight and resiliency are 
weaknesses; that part of leadership is not becoming complacent because strength is not 
absolute.   
The recommendations in this thesis are expressions of this spirit.  In this thesis 
new concepts for assessing and redesigning government have been introduced.  The 
identification and definition of performance measures, called Negative Characteristics, 
were articulated as new metrics for assessing federal law enforcement’s investigative 
function.  The concept of Integration Evolution was also introduced and details of its 
multi-phased nature were explained.  This integrative scheme can be easily applied to 
governmental and non-governmental mergers.     
These new metrics and concepts were not only identified and defined, but applied 
to form the central argument of this thesis, which in and of itself is not a widely discussed 
topic.  Advocacy for the integration of the FBI, ICE, DEA, ATF, IRS-CID and USSS-
Investigations is an emergent idea.  It is my hope that the original data gathered for this 
thesis is expanded upon so that the material and pervasive presence of the Negative 
Characteristics is recognized, understood and acted on.   
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The idea of integrating law enforcement agencies is not new, and as the events of 
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have shown, the need for law enforcement to operate in a 
smarter and more cohesive manner has never been more evident.  However, the current 
configuration of major law enforcement agencies within three different executive 
departments, Justice, Treasury and Homeland Security produces interagency conflict, 
redundancy, data fragmentation, jurisdictional foreclosure, and increased civil rights 
violations.   This diminishes the collective and singular efforts of each agency.  
Centralization of the Big Six’s command structures will marginalize the negative 
byproducts brought upon by their separation.   How this centralization occurs is also 
crucial.   
Admittedly, integration of the Big Six will not eradicate all dysfunction from 
federal law enforcement.  For example, the FBI and U.S. Coast Guard, two agencies no 
one has proposed to merge, are engaged in a turf battle over maritime response 
programs.118  Yet, my argument in this thesis is that the problems and dysfunctions that 
are common, repeated and not surprising to persons familiar with federal law 
enforcement can be remedied, at least as it relates to the Big Six.   
Practically speaking, the solution for America will be an American solution. The 
adage “think idealistically, act realistically” must be employed by policymakers when 
searching for the remedy to the U.S.’ investigative and domestic intelligence deficits.  
While the topic of creating a dedicated domestic intelligence agency has been widely 
debated, broadly conceptualizing our national need as an all-hazards homeland defense 
and security mission is part of a new paradigm.  The streamlining of a reconstituted FBI’s 
mission easily comports with this new paradigm.  Such efforts are essential so that the 
myriad constituent agencies on the local, state, and federal level can be enveloped in a 
meaningful way.    
My father used to tell me, “leaders keep moving.”  I took this to mean different 
things depending upon the situation.  At times, I interpreted it in a “when the going gets 
tough, the tough get going” sort of way, while at others, I thought it meant I should not 
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become complacent after achieving some goal.  In light of topics discussed in this paper, 
I think both interpretations are meaningful.  The U.S. suffered at tragic blow on 9/11, but 
not a devastating blow.  Even Hurricane Katrina did not affect the nation existentially.  
Nevertheless, as the world’s single superpower we should not rest on our laurels.  If our 
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